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The impact of food policy and retailer strategic behavior on consumer welfare has been widely 
explored by researchers desiring to help policy makers to address the issues of unhealthy diets and 
excessive market power within the supply chain. This work contributes to the existing body of 
literature on food policy and social welfare by analyzing the impacts of three different policies that 
affect food purchases. In the first chapter, we evaluate the effects of different carbon taxes on food 
acquisitions to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from the food system in the U.S. Our results show 
that these policies may significantly reduce the carbon footprint of food purchases (from -3% to -
5%), mainly thanks to the fall in meat and animal-based products consumption. However, these 
policies are regressive, as poorer households are more burdened by the tax than relatively more 
affluent consumers. Moreover, the impact on the nutritional composition of food purchases is 
uncertain. So, trade-offs exist among environmental, nutritional and distributional goals. The 
second essay analyzes the welfare implications of private label (PLs) introduction in a 
differentiated market. We find that equilibrium prices would be higher if PLs were not in the 
market. Moreover, producer surplus would be lower, as PLs profits would only be partially 
distributed across the remaining brands. Finally, consumers would be worse off because of higher 
market prices and lower product variety. Therefore, we can argue that PLs are social welfare-
enhancing. In the last chapter, we develop a framework to estimate the effects of anti-price gouging 
(APG) laws on prices and product availability during a natural disaster and provide an empirical 
illustration. A difference-in-difference approach can provide unbiased estimate of the causal 
impacts of interest if comparable treatment and control groups are chosen. To ensure that this 
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condition holds, the “parallel trend” assumption for the outcome variables of interest should be 
tested. The results from our empirical application show that APG laws might be effective in 
keeping prices stable during a state of emergency without worsening supply shortages.
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Chapter 1 
 
Use of Carbon Taxes on Food Purchases to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in the U.S. 
 
1.1 Introduction  
During the last few decades, rising concerns about the negative impacts of climate change 
on agriculture, the environment, health, and the economy as a whole have led several developed 
countries to put the reduction and mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGEs) on their 
political agenda. In 2015, the United States reported to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) its target of reducing total emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels 
by 2025 (The White House 2015). While recognizing the essential role of agriculture in sustaining 
human life, it is important to also acknowledge that this sector contributes directly and indirectly 
to more than 20% of global GHGEs (IPPC 2014). Furthermore, livestock, especially ruminants 
such as cattle, produces almost one third of the total emissions from the agricultural sector through 
their normal digestive processes (EPA).  
The U.S. may choose among several policy alternatives to get agriculture to contribute 
towards its desired emissions target, such as price-based approaches, cap and trade policies, as 
well as taxes or direct subsidies. According to the conventional economic wisdom, taxing the 
source of emissions would be optimal to address the discrepancy between the private and social 
cost of production due to the negative externalities associated with GHGEs. However, taxes on 
output are preferable when the monitoring costs are high, the potential for technological advances 
 
 
2 
 
in emissions control is limited and output can be easily substituted by consumers. These conditions 
typically hold in the case of GHGEs from food production in developed countries (Wirsenius, 
Hedenus, and Mohlin 2011). Furthermore, taxing consumers rather than producers is preferable to 
avoid the so called “carbon leakage”, that is, the increase in GHGEs in foreign countries due to 
the U.S. effort to reduce its own GHGEs. Moreover, an emission tax on the U.S. agricultural and 
food production may harm domestic producers, by incentivizing  consumers to buy the relatively 
cheaper foreign products (Edjabou and Smed 2013).  
For these reasons, a carbon tax on food purchases has been proposed as a cost-effective 
tool for helping with GHGEs mitigation by several authors (i.e. Edjabou and Smed 2013; Caillavet 
et al. 2016). This policy does, however, have some drawbacks. First, it may encourage the 
consumption of unhealthy food products with ingredients like solid fats and added sugars that are 
also characterized by relatively low carbon footprints (Briggs et al., 2013 and 2016). Second, it 
may be regressive, as poorer people spend a higher share of their income on food and are more 
burdened by the tax than the relatively affluent consumers (Kehlbacher et al. 2016; Garcia-Muros 
et al., 2017). Ideally, policy makers should account for these possibly negative health and social 
equity implications when designing a sustainable food policy to reduce GHGEs. 
The goal of this this chapter is, indeed, to investigate how a carbon tax on food purchases 
would contribute to the mitigation of GHGEs from the U.S. agricultural and food sectors, and to 
predict the welfare, nutritional, and distributional implications of a policy of this type. Our results 
can be of interest to policy makers desiring to help steer consumers of all income levels to diets 
which are low-carbon and nutritionally adequate. In details, we evaluate the impacts of five 
different carbon consumption taxes. In the first three simulations, we analyze a Pigouvian tax 
which is proportional to the GHGEs generated across each food’s entire life cycle and is levied on 
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1) meat only (MEAT); 2) all animal products except for fish (ALL-ANIM); 3) all foods (ALL-
FOOD). We set our baseline carbon tax equal to $36 per metric ton of CO2-eq which corresponds 
to the social cost per metric ton of carbon dioxide estimated in 2000-prices by the EPA (EPA). 
This roughly corresponds to $40 in 2012-prices. In the fourth simulation (REV-NEUTR), the 
carbon tax on all foods is combined with subsidies to achieve a “revenue-neutral” policy. Finally, 
we develop an “optimal” carbon tax policy which is “feasible” and “politically acceptable” at the 
same time. To be “politically acceptable”, this policy should entail a significant reduction in 
GHGEs from food acquisitions, while being revenue-neutral. Moreover, it should not change 
drastically U.S. households’ food consumption patterns. This means that it should involve a limited 
number of food categories, which is also a necessary condition for being “feasible”, as it would 
minimize the administrative costs.  
To achieve this goal, we estimate the demand for the main food product categories 
purchased by U.S. consumers using the Almost Ideal demand system (ADIS) model (Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980) and the USDA’s National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey 
(FoodAPS) data1. The GHGEs for each product category are derived according to the “Economic 
Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment” (EIO-LCA) method (Carnegie Mellon University). Using 
the own-price and cross-price elasticity values recovered from the estimated demand parameter 
and the post-tax prices, we simulate the new market equilibrium under the different carbon taxes 
scenarios. This allows us to evaluate the changes in U.S. consumer purchasing behavior and in 
welfare, as well as in the total GHGEs from food acquisitions. Thanks to the nutritional 
information provided in the FoodAPS data, we derive the changes in the diet quality of U.S. 
                                                          
1 Data last accessed on March, 2018. For more information about FoodAPS, please see the USDA, ERS website at: 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foodaps-national-household-food-acquisition-and-purchase-survey/ 
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households across income classes after the policy application. The distributional implications are 
then evaluated using the Kakwani index (Kakwani 1977).  
Our results show that carbon taxes can be an effective instrument to reduce the carbon 
footprint of food acquisitions (from -3% to -5%) and improve social welfare due to avoided 
GHGEs pollution external costs (from +90 to +433 million dollars), with a negligible impact on 
food-at-home budget (on average -0.1%). The greatest GHGEs abatement is achieved when all 
foods are taxed (ALL-FOOD) (-5.2%) and is mainly driven by the striking decrease in the 
consumption of meat and dairy products. However, this policy is the most inefficient (-0.76$/kg 
of CO2eq), as it entails the biggest loss in consumer welfare per kilogram of CO2-eq reduction. On 
the other hand, in the most efficient scenario (REV-NEUTRAL) we find a 4% decrease in which 
is below the one recommended in the first Kyoto’s protocol agreement (-5%). This implies that a 
trade-off exists between GHGEs abatement and consumer welfare. Even though most scenarios 
lead to a decrease in the intake of several nutrients that are deleterious to health (i.e. cholesterol, 
saturated fats, alcohol and sodium), it is important to acknowledge that the total quantity of many 
healthy nutrients (i.e. calcium, potassium and vitamin D) decreases too in almost all simulations, 
mainly because of the decline in the total volume of food purchases, and also, in the consumption 
of dairy products. Overall, these outcomes show how environmental and nutritional objectives are 
not always aligned.  Focusing on the distributional implications, consistently with previous studies 
(i.e. Kehlbacher et al. 2016; García-Muros et al. 2017) we find that carbon taxes on food purchases 
are regressive, as the Kakwani index is negative in all the cases we analyze. However, we also find 
that the Kakwani index values in the revenue-neutral scenarios (REV-NEUTRAL and OPTIMAL) 
are very close to zero, meaning that it is possible to design a carbon-based food tax that is almost 
neutral in terms of social equity by re-distributing the tax revenues in the form of food subsidies. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we review the most important 
studies on carbon consumption taxes and define our contributions to the existing body of literature. 
Section 1.3 describes the data used in our analysis (food purchases and GHGEs data), while in 
section 1.4 we illustrate the demand model and estimation, and the simulation approach. Section 
1.5 discusses the results of the simulations conducted and policy recommendations. 
 
1.2 Literature review  
The recent economics literature has devoted increasing attention to the implementation of 
fiscal policies that promote changes in food purchases to reduce GHGEs. (Wirsenius, Hedenus, 
and Mohlin 2011) simulate the impact of a GHGEs weighted consumption tax (60€ per ton of CO2 
equivalents (CO2-eq)) on animal food products in the EU. Their results show that agricultural 
emissions would decrease by 7% after the tax introduction. Moreover, most of the GHGEs 
mitigation impact could be achieved by taxing the consumption of ruminant meat alone.  
Edjabou and Smed (2013) analyze the impact of a carbon tax on food consumption on 
GHGEs, consumer welfare and the nutritional composition of the diet for Danish household. In 
details, they suggest Pigouvian taxes on foods which are proportional to the average GHGEs per 
kg of each type of food product. They use data from the Statistics Denmark’s consumer service 
and the elasticity derived from the Almost Ideal Demand Model (AIDS) to simulate the changes 
in consumers’ behavior due to the carbon tax introduction under different scenarios. They find that 
the carbon footprint from the food purchases of an average household may decrease by 2.3%-8.8% 
in the most efficient scenario, at a cost of 0.15-1.73DKK per kg of CO2-eq. On the other hand, 
GHGEs may decrease by 10-4%-19.4% in the most effective scenario, at a cost of 3.53-6.9 DKK 
per kg of CO2-eq. However, the authors find some controversial results in terms of diet quality of 
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Danish consumers. For example, while saturated fats are expected to decrease after the fiscal policy 
is applied, total calories intake may not decrease. Moreover, they predict an increase in added 
sugars consumption in some cases. 
Briggs et al. (2013) use a similar approach to estimate the impact of a carbon tax on food 
and drink purchases on chronic diseases in the UK. However, their methodology differs from the 
one from the one by Edjabou and Smed (2013) in that they use the agriculture marginal abatement 
cost curve (MACC) to compute the tax rate. They carry out two simulations. In the first one, they 
assume the tax is levy on all food products with above average GHGEs. In the second one, they 
allow for subsidies on food groups with below average GHGEs too. The results from both 
scenarios confirm the effectiveness of a policy of this type in reducing the carbon foot print from 
food consumption. However, they also prove that sustainability and health objectives may not 
always be aligned. In details, while the first policy would lead to lower deaths, mainly thanks to 
the lower calories intake, the second scenario would lead to higher deaths in the UK population 
due to an increase in the calories consumed and a lower nutritional quality of the diet. 
As taxes on foods are often criticized for being regressive, some authors, like Kehlbacher 
et al. (2016) for the UK and Garcia-Muros et al. (2017) for Spain, focus their analysis on the 
distributional implications of a carbon tax. Both studies indicate that an emissions tax on food 
consumption may be regressive as the tax burden would fall disproportionately on the households 
in the lowest socio-economic class. However, this negative outcome can be improved if tax 
exemptions on some basic commodities are introduced. 
Given these controversial results, Caillavet et al. (2016) evaluate different policies to 
address GHGEs from food purchases, while also accounting for nutritional and social equity 
concerns. To do so, they use scanner data for food-at-home consumption (FAH) for French 
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consumers and the elasticities derived from the Exact-Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand system 
to simulate two policy scenarios: the “environmental” (ENV) and the “environmental-nutritional” 
(ENV-NUT) scenarios respectively. In the “environmental scenario”, they focus only on GHGEs 
mitigation objectives, and so, taxes are levied on animal food products only as they are the highest 
GHGEs producers. In the second simulation, they include nutritional concerns too. As a 
consequence, only the animal products with high fat content are taxed in this case. In both cases, 
they assume the tax increases prices by 20%. To account for the distributional implications of each 
policy, they divide the French households into cohorts, based on their income level, age and 
geographical location. Overall, the authors predict a significant reduction in GHGEs from food 
purchases, in particular thanks to the substitution between plant- and animal-based products. This 
reduction is particularly high in the ENV simulation. On the other hand, the diet quality improves 
only in the ENV-NUT scenario. Although both policies would be regressive, given the higher 
impact on the two lower income classes, the ENV-NUT scenario remain the better one also from 
this perspective, given the lower reduction in households’ purchasing power. 
Revoredo-Giha et al. (2018) follow an approach that is similar to the one by Caillavet et 
al. (2016) to evaluate two different consumption taxes in the UK: an ad valorem tax (20%) and a 
carbon tax which is proportional to the GHGEs of each food group. Their results indicate that a 
carbon tax would be more effective in reducing GHGEs from food purchases than an ad valorem 
tax. However, the intake of essential nutrients would also decrease under this scenario. This study 
confirms how creating an environmental-friendly and healthy diet through a fiscal policy may be 
extremely challenging. 
Dogbe and Gil (2018) compare different carbon tax policies for Catalonia (North-East 
Spain) to evaluate the impacts in terms of emissions, diet quality and welfare. They find that a 
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revenue-neutral policy is the most plausible alternative to achieve a significant reduction in 
GHGEs (-6.4%) while minimizing the loss in consumer welfare and slightly improving the quality 
of the diet. 
Our research builds on these studies by integrating them in a unique framework. To the 
best of our knowledge, this represents the first attempt to evaluate the deployment of such a carbon 
tax to reduce GHGEs in the U.S. An analysis of this type is needed, as the characteristics of food 
demand in the U.S. and Europe differ significantly from each other. For example, many foods are 
less expensive in the U.S. than in several wealthier European countries (i.e. UK, France, Denmark 
and Spain that were analyzed in previous studies). Moreover, the average per capita income in the 
U.S. is higher than in Europe, and so, the share of the total expenditure spent on food is lower in 
the U.S. As a consequence, the impact of a fiscal policy on food acquisitions in the U.S. may have 
very different implications than in a European country (Mitchell, 2004). Moreover, per capita meat 
consumption in the U.S. is four times the world average and it is more than twice the one in Europe 
(OECD, 2017). Finally, the existence of food assistance programs in the U.S. (i.e. Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) makes the analysis of a carbon tax in this country even 
more intricate and implies additional policy implications. 
 
1.3 Data 
1.3.1 Food purchases data 
To examine food purchases in the U.S., we use food-at-home (FAH) expenditure data from 
the USDA’s National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) Public Use 
Files (PUF)2. FoodAPS is a nationally representative survey which collects detailed information 
                                                          
2 Data last accessed on March, 2018. For more information about FoodAPS, please see the USDA, ERS website at: 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foodaps-national-household-food-acquisition-and-purchase-survey/ 
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on food acquisitions for 4,826 households over a seven-day period from April 2012 to January 
2013. During the survey, participants were asked to report their food acquisitions into a book. For 
each shopping trip, information was collected regarding the outlet category, the household’s 
expenditure on each item as well as the total expenditure, the number of items that were bought, 
the package size and the grams per item. Moreover, detailed household sociodemographic and 
economic characteristics, as well as the nutrient content of each food were recorded. 
Following Caillavet et al. (2016), we aggregate households into cohorts to create a pseudo-
panel and recover a full set of food purchases throughout the survey period. Cohorts are defined 
to capture potential sources of heterogeneity in food acquisitions based on: 
• households’ income level which is defined as a percentage of the U.S. Federal 
Poverty Threshold (FPT) adjusted for the household size; 
• participation to food assistance programs (i.e. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, SNAP); 
• household size; 
• region (Northeast, Midwest, South and West).  
Our sample includes 80 cohorts and 35 time periods, resulting in an unbalanced panel of 
1,950 observations.  
In line with previous studies investigating consumers’ food choices in presence of 
nutritional and environmental concerns (i.e Edjabou and Smed 2013; García-Muros et al. 2017; 
Revoredo-Giha, Chalmers, and Akaichi 2018), we allocate food items to the following 16 groups: 
milk and yogurt; cheese and other dairy products; meat; poultry and eggs; fish; plant-based protein 
food; grains; vegetables; potatoes; fruits; salty snacks; sweets; water, coffee and tea; soft-drinks; 
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alcoholic beverages; others. A detailed description of these groups is reported in Table 1.1, while 
Table 1.2 shows the average market share and price per kilogram for each food category. 
 
1.3.2 Greenhouse gas emissions data 
To estimate the greenhouse gases emissions (GHGEs) from food acquisition we use the 
Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment (EIO-LCA) method (Carnegie Mellon University). 
According to the Economic Input-Output (EIO) approach, the relationship between the total 
industry output (X) and the final demand of a good (y) is represented by the following relationship:  
                                                                 X=(I-A)-1 y                                                                              (1.1) 
where X is a n by 1 vector of the total output for the n industries in the economy, I is an n 
by n identity matrix, A is the n by n direct requirements matrix and y is an n by 1 vector of the 
final demand for the n goods in the market. The matrix (I-A)-1 is also known as the total 
requirements matrix as it shows the total production required, both directly and indirectly, from 
each industry to produce one dollar of final demand of a given commodity. One of the advantages 
of the EIO approach is that all the matrices and vectors are expressed in dollar terms, allowing for 
comparisons across industries. 
As originally suggested by Leontif, the EIO model can be expanded to include non-
economic impacts as follows: 
                                                            B= RX=R(I-A)-1 y                                                                        (1.2) 
where B is n by 1 vector representing the total (direct and indirect) external impact per 
dollar for the industries in the economy and R is an n by n diagonal matrix with the direct external 
output per dollar of economic activity of the nth industry along the diagonal. In our analysis, the 
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R matrix reports the direct emission intensity factor (EIF) for each industry which is defined as 
kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalents per dollar of output (kg CO2eq/$).  
For this study, we derive the total requirements table, (I-A)-1, from the 2007 Benchmark 
Input-Output (IO) tables for 389 industries provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
while the direct and life cycle GHGEs for each industry that are included in the R and B matrix 
are computed using the environmentally extended input-output (USEEIO) model satellite tables 
(“Greenhouse gas satellite account for the US economy”) developed by Yang et al. (2017) and 
available at the EPA website3.  
As the USEEIO GHGEs data reflects the amount of external output (i.e. kg of CO2eq) 
generated per dollar of the industry activity evaluated at the producer price level, we have to 
convert them into the corresponding emissions at the purchaser price level. Following  Suh (2005), 
we transform producer values into purchaser values using the 2007 BEA margins table to account 
for the transportation costs and the retail and wholesale margins for each industry. Table 1.3 shows 
the emission intensity factors (EIFs) we derive for the industries in the U.S. economy that are 
involved in agriculture and food manufacturing. The EIFs are defined in kilograms of carbon 
dioxide equivalents per dollar of output (kg CO2eq/$).  
Following the approach developed by Boehm et al. (2018), we assume that each food item 
reported in the FoodAPS data is produced by one of the industries listed in table 1.3. Items are 
matched to the corresponding BEA industry using the USDA Food and Nutrient Database for 
Dietary Studies (FNDDS) and the 4-digit Food Pattern Equivalents Ingredients (FPID) food codes 
                                                          
3 Data last accessed on May 10, 2017. For more information about USEEIO data, please see the EPA website at: 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/useeio-elementary-flows-and-life-cycle-impact-assessment-lcia-characterization-
factors 
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and descriptions4. The EIFs for the 16 food groups we define in section 1.3.1 are then computed 
as the mean over the EIFs of all the foods included in the category. 
Table 1.4 shows the EIFs and the share of total GHGEs from food acquisitions for each 
food group. Beef and pork meat show the highest EIF (2.33 kg of CO2eq/$) and alone accounts for 
almost 20% of total GHGEs from food purchases, followed by other animal-based products, such 
as cheese (1.98 kg of CO2eq/$) and milk (1.85 kg of CO2eq/$). Overall, these products determine 
more than 35% of total GHGEs from food purchases. Our results confirm that poultry and fish are 
more environmentally-friendly sources of animal-proteins than meat, as their EIFs are less than 
half the one of meat. This is particularly true for fish, as its EIF (0.57 kg of CO2eq/$) is the lowest 
across all food products. Despite their relatively low EIFs (about 0.8 kg of CO2eq/$), grains (12%), 
vegetables (9.2%) and sweets (9.1%) entail a share of GHGEs comparable to the one of more 
carbon-intensive foods (i.e. milk and cheese) because of the high volume of purchases from U.S. 
households. 
 
1.4 Model and methods 
1.4.1 Demand model and estimation strategy 
In our empirical application, food demand is modeled according to the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) model (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) in its linear approximation (LA-
AIDS) (Moschini 1995). The AIDS model has been widely used in scientific literature to estimate 
food demand (Smed, Jensen, and Denver 2007; García-Muros et al. 2017) as it enables a first order 
approximation to any demand system functional form, it satisfies the economic axioms of choice 
and it allows perfect aggregation over consumers (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). 
                                                          
4 For more information see (Boehm et al. 2018), Supporting information, section 2: ”Mapping foods to agricultural 
or food manufacturing industries”. 
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As in Caillavet et al. (2016), the demand system in this study is based on cohort 
observations, c. Under the weak separability assumption, the demand for each food group i is 
defined as a function of its own price and the prices of other foods, as well as of total food 
expenditure:                                                                     
                                    wict = αi + ∑j γijlnpjct + βiln(xct/Pct) + ∑kdk+ εict                                        (1.3) 
where wict is the average expenditure share of food i over the households belonging to 
cohort c at time t, pjct is the market price of commodity j, xct is total food expenditure, dk is a set of 
dummy variables to capture potential systematic differences across states and time periods, and Pct 
is the Stone Price index defined as: 
                                                          lnPct= ∑j wjctln(pjct)                                               (1.4)                                                                                          
Finally, εict is the idiosyncratic error term. 
The adding up (1.5), homogeneity (1.6) and symmetry (1.7) properties of demand can be 
imposed through linear parameter restrictions, as follows: 
                                                  ∑
i αi=1,  ∑i γij=0,  ∑i βi=0                                                     (1.5) 
                                                             ∑
j γij=0                                                                   (1.6) 
                                                              γij=γji                                                                      (1.7) 
The demand system estimates can be used to compute the expenditure elasticities, εi, and 
the uncompensated price elasticities, εi,j, as follows: 
                                                             εi  =  
βi
wi
 + 1                                                                (1.8) 
                                                        εi,j =  
γij
wi
 −  βi 
wj
wi
 − δij                                                                                    (1.9) 
where δij is the Kronecker delta which is equal to 1 when i is equal to j and 0 otherwise. 
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The demand system in (1.3) is estimated for (j-1) equations in STATA 14 by Zellner’s 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method (Zellner, 1962) after imposing the homogeneity and 
symmetry constraints as in (1.6) and (1.7). The j-th equation is omitted to overcome singularity 
problems and its parameters are recovered using the properties of demand derived from 
microeconomic theory as in (1.6), (1.7) and (1.9). Table 1.5 shows the AIDS model estimation 
results, while price and expenditure elasticities are shown in table 1.6 and 1.7 respectively. Our 
results are in line with previous estimates of price elasticity of the demand for food in the U.S 
(Andreyeva, Long, and Brownell 2010). 
Estimates of the parameters of equation (1.3) can be biased if prices are correlated with 
demand shocks unaccounted for by other variables in the model (Bonanno 2013). Therefore, an 
instrumental variable (IVs) approach is required to obtain unbiased estimates. The instruments we 
use in our analysis are cost shifters, such as the average unit size and retail gasoline and diesel 
prices provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, and Hausmann-type instruments 
(Hausman, Leonard, and Zona 1994), that is, the price of a commodity in another region during 
the same time period. The identifying assumption for using Hausmann IVs is that region-specific 
demand shocks are independent across U.S. states, but prices of a given commodity in different 
U.S. areas are correlated with each other because of common marginal costs.  
The instruments’ orthogonality is tested using Sargan’s χ2 test (Sargan 1958). As the 
Sargan’s test statistics are not statistically significant, we conclude that the instruments we use in 
our analysis are valid. Moreover, according to Staiger and Stock’s (1997) “rule of thumb”, we can 
rule out the issue of “weak instruments” as the value of the F-statistics for the joint significance of 
the instruments’ parameters in the first stage-regression exceed 10.  
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1.4.2 Tax scenarios and impacts evaluation 
A set of five tax scenarios is considered in this analysis to evaluate different policies that 
address the issue of GHGEs from the food system while accounting for the nutritional and welfare 
implications. First, following Edjabou and Smed (2013), García-Muros et al. (2017) and 
Revoredo-Giha, Chalmers, and Akaichi (2018), we simulate a Pigouvian tax which is proportional 
to the GHGEs generated across each food’s entire life cycle. To correct for the market failure, the 
optimal tax rate has to be equivalent to the monetary value of the externality generated to the 
society by GHGEs. We set our baseline carbon tax equal to $36 per metric ton of CO2-eq which 
corresponds to the social cost per metric ton of carbon dioxide estimated in 2000-prices by the 
EPA (EPA). This roughly corresponds to $40 in 2012-prices. We compare different scenarios 
where the carbon tax is levied on: 1) meat only (MEAT); 2) all animal products except for fish 
(ALL-ANIM); 3) all foods (ALL-FOOD). Fish is exempt from the tax in simulation 2 given its 
low EIF and the relatively small contribution of this food category to total GHGEs from food 
acquisitions (see Table 1.2). Moreover, an increase intake of this food group is recommended for 
U.S. households (USDA, 2010). The tax rate for each food item i is computed according to the 
following formula: 
                                                                       ti= (Ei * pe)                                                             (1.10) 
where Ei is the carbon footprint of food i computed through the life cycle assessment 
method explained in section 1.3.2 and pe is the EPA social cost of carbon. 
Two additional fiscal policies are explored. In the fourth simulation (REV-NEUTR), the 
carbon tax on all foods as in the ALL-FOOD scenario is combined with subsidies to achieve a 
“revenue-neutral” policy, as the total revenue received from the tax is redistributed amongst food 
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categories with relatively lower EIFs. As a result, the price change for the most carbon-intensive 
foods is positive while the opposite is true for the products with the lowest EIFs. 
In our last simulation (OPTIMAL), we develop an “optimal” carbon tax policy which is 
“feasible” and “politically acceptable” at the same time. To be “politically acceptable”, this policy 
should entail a significant reduction in GHGEs from food acquisitions, while being revenue-
neutral. Moreover, it should not change drastically U.S. households’ food consumption patterns. 
This means that a policy of this type should involve a limited number of food categories, which is 
also a necessary condition for being “feasible”, as it would minimize the administrative costs. As 
a consequence, using the Microsoft Excel Solver tool, we find a revenue-neutral policy that 
minimizes the changes in food acquisitions while decreasing GHGEs by 5%. The GHGEs 
reduction target is set according to the Kyoto’s Protocol first commitment period (2008-2012) 
(European Commission).  
Table 1.8 shows the resulting tax and subsidy rates for each of the simulated scenarios. 
Overall, price changes range from -20% to 16.8% and meat and foods of animal origins (i.e. milk, 
cheese and poultry) show the highest tax rates in all the simulated scenarios because of their high 
EIFs. Fish has the lowest tax rate across all animal products and, more in general, across all food 
groups (except for alcohol). This explains why this food category is highly subsidized in the REV-
NEUTR scenario, together with plant-based protein foods, vegetables and fruits. Finally, according 
to the results provided by the Excel Solver tool, the optimal carbon tax policy (OPTIMAL) consists 
in a high tax rate on beef and pork meat (+16.8%), which is almost the double of the ones we get 
in all the other scenarios (+9-3%), and a high subsidy rate on vegetables (-13.9%).  Moreover, fish 
should be subsidized too (-0.4%), 
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Consistently with previous studies (i.e. (Edjabou and Smed 2013; Dogbe and Gil 2018), 
we assume that food supply is perfectly inelastic and that it is not affected by the aforementioned 
taxes. To avoid trade distortions, we also assume the concurrent introduction of an export tariff 
that is equivalent to the carbon tax for each food group. In this way, we can predict the change in 
food acquisitions (ΔQi) and the new equilibrium quantities (Qit) under each counterfactual 
simulation using the own-price and cross-price elasticity values recovered from the estimated 
demand parameters and the post-tax prices, as follows: 
                                           
ΔQi
Qi
= ∑ εij
N
j ∗
ΔPj
Pj
                                                           (1.11)     
                                                           Qi
t = Qi + ΔQi                                                              (1.12) 
Where 
𝛥𝑄𝑖
𝑄𝑖
 and 
𝛥𝑃𝑗
𝑃𝑗
  are the percentage changes in quantities demanded and prices for the i-
th and j-th group respectively and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the price elasticity of food i with respect to the price of the 
j-th category.  
Following Diewert (1992) and Edjabou and Smed (2013), the change in the carbon 
footprint (CF) and in consumer surplus (CS) can be approximated using the following equations: 
                                               ΔCF = ei ∗ ΔQi                                                                             (1.13) 
                                          ΔCS = 0.5 ∗ (Pit − Pi ) ∗ (Qi
t + Qi)                                  (1.14) 
Where ei is the EIF and Pi
t and Pi are the post and pre-tax prices for food i respectively. On 
the other hand, the social welfare (SW) gain due to avoided GHGEs pollution external costs is 
derived as follows: 
                                      ΔSW = 0.5 ∗ (Pit − Pi ) ∗ (Qi
t − Qi)                                 (1.15) 
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Moreover, we assess the variation in the U.S. households’ diet quality after the tax 
introduction by evaluating the changes in the intake of some key nutrients (Nk), using the following 
formula:  
                                             ΔNk = nki ∗ ΔQi                                                            (1.16) 
Where nik is the average content of nutrient k in one kilogram of food i. In details, we focus 
on energy, macronutrients (carbohydrates, proteins and fats) and two sets of micronutrients: 1) 
saturated fats, cholesterol, added sugars, sodium and alcohol; 2) fiber, potassium, calcium and 
vitamin D. This is because, according to the USDA “Dietary guidelines for Americans” the 
micronutrients in group 1) should be reduced while those in group 2) should be increased to 
improve the overall quality of the U.S. diet (USDA, 2010). 
Finally, the distributional implications of the carbon taxes are derived using the Kakwani 
index, which is computed as the difference between the Gini index for the social intervention, and 
the Gini index for pre-tax incomes. The Kakwani index ranges between -1 and +1. If the Kakwani 
index is lower than zero, this means that lower income consumers are more burdened by the tax 
than relatively more affluent households, and so, the policy is regressive. The opposite is true if 
the index is higher than zero. A policy is defined as proportional or neutral if the Kakwani index 
is equal to zero (Kakwani 1977; García-Muros et al. 2017). 
To evaluate the impacts of the different carbon tax policies, the FoodAPS households are 
grouped into four classed based on family income and participation to the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP): 1) non-SNAP households with incomes below 100% of the U.S. 
Federal poverty threshold (FPT); 2) SNAP households with incomes below 100% of the FPT; 3) 
SNAP households with incomes above 100% of the FPT; 4) non-SNAP households with incomes 
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above 100% of the FPT. All the simulations and post-simulations calculations are carried out using 
Microsoft Excel. 
 
1.5 Simulations results 
 To evaluate the different carbon tax policies described in section 1.4.2, we first focus on 
whether they generate a significant decrease in GHGEs from food acquisitions and the associated 
changes in consumers’ surplus and social welfare. Then, we analyze the effects on the diet quality 
of U.S. households by comparing the changes in the intake of some key nutrients. Finally, we 
derive the distributional implications.  
The projected changes in foods consumption and total food expenditure under each 
simulated scenario are shown in figure 1.1, while figure 1.2 illustrates the percentage reduction in 
GHGEs from food acquisitions caused by the carbon taxes. As noted by García-Muros et al. 
(2017), the consumption and GHGEs for each food group change by the same proportion, as the 
EIFs are kept constant. For example, if milk consumption decreases by 1%, this implies that the 
GHGEs generated from this food group falls by 1% too. Overall, the decrease in the carbon 
footprint of food purchases caused by the carbon taxes ranges from about -3% to -5%. These results 
are consistent with the ones obtained in previous studies that use similar tax rates for some 
European countries (i.e. (Edjabou and Smed 2013; Kehlbacher et al. 2016; García-Muros et al. 
2017; Revoredo-Giha, Chalmers, and Akaichi 2018). The largest reduction in GHGEs (-5.2%) 
arises in the uncompensated scenario when all foods are taxed (ALL-FOOD), while the lowest one 
(-2.9%) is reached when only meat is taxed (MEAT). The revenue-neutral policy (REV-NEUTR) 
and the tax on all animal products (ALL-ANIM) lie in between determining a 4% fall in the carbon 
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footprint. This means that only the ALL-FOOD scenario and, by construction, the optimal policy 
we elaborate (OPTIMAL) would achieve the Kyoto’s Protocol 5% reduction target. 
As we can see from Figure 1.1, the reduction in GHGEs from the food system in mainly 
driven by the striking fall in meat consumption (from -11% to -14%), particularly under the 
OPTIMAL policy scenario (-25%). This is of little surprise, as this food group is characterized by 
the highest EIF and tax rate. In the ALL-ANIM, ALL-FOOD and REV-NEUTR. scenarios, the 
decrease in consumption of other animal-based products, such as cheese (from –8% to -9%), milk 
(from –6% to -8%) and poultry (from –2% to -3%), gives a significant contribution too. Differently 
from the first three uncompensated simulations, the REV-NEUTR policy also determines a 
significant increase in the purchases of fish (+21%), plant-based protein foods (+26%), vegetables 
(+24%) and fruits (+21%). This is because these food categories are highly subsidized under this 
scenario thanks to their low EIFs. A similar increase in vegetables acquisitions (+18%) is obtained 
in the OPTIMAL policy simulation. Finally, the last set of columns in Figure 1.1, indicates that 
total food expenditure is almost unaffected by the tax introduction. As the carbon taxes bring about 
a general price increase, this implies that real food expenditure decreases, and so, that the total 
quantity of food purchased by U.S. households decreases too. 
Table 1.9 summarizes the change in consumer surplus (CS) and the increase in social 
welfare due to avoided external cost from GHGEs pollution for the entire U.S. population per year. 
It also shows the efficiency of each carbon tax policy that is defined as the cost in terms of 
consumer welfare loss per kg of CO2-eq reduction (Edjabou and Smed 2013). As expected, the 
ALL-FOOD scenario generates the highest loss in CS ($-3,782 million) as all foods are taxed, 
while the opposite is true for the REV-NEUTRAL scenario ($-433 million), as the tax revenues 
are re-distributed in the form of subsidies. Moreover, our results prove that carbon taxes on food 
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acquisitions may significantly improve social welfare thanks to the reduction in the costs generated 
by GHGEs pollution (from $57 million in the MEAT scenario to $101 million in the ALL-FOOD 
simulation). The REV-NEUTRAL and OPTIMAL policies are the most efficient ones, as they 
entail the lowest reduction in CS per kg of CO2-eq abatement (-0.08 and -0.18 dollars per kg of 
CO2-eq respectively), while the ALL-FOOD tax is the least efficient as it causes a welfare loss 
that is almost ten times the one generated under the most effective simulation (-0.76 dollars per kg 
of CO2-eq). Our results are consistent with the ones by Edjabou and Smed (2013) who found that 
an uncompensated carbon tax in Denmark would generate a CS loss of 3.17 DKK ($0.45) per kg 
of CO2-eq reduction. 
We illustrate the projected changes in macronutrients and micronutrients intakes under 
each simulated carbon tax in figure 1.3 and figure 1.4 respectively. Focusing on macronutrients, 
consistently with previous studies (i.e..Edjabou and Smed , 2013; Caillavet, Fadhuile, and Nichèle, 
2016; Kehlbacher et al., 2016), we find that all the policies we simulate lead to a decrease in 
calories, due to the reduction in the total quantity of food purchases. Proteins fall even to a higher 
extent, in particular in the ALL-FOOD scenario, because of the sharp reduction in animal proteins 
from food groups such as meat, cheese and milk which are the most affected by the carbon taxes. 
The same outcome is found by other authors, such as García-Muros et al. (2017), Revoredo-Giha, 
Chalmers, and Akaichi (2018) and Dogbe and Gil (2018). A reduction in total calories is 
considered to be positive, as U.S. households’ energy intake exceeds their daily needs. On the 
other hand, the fall in proteins is more difficult to interpret, as according to the USDA Dietary 
Guidelines, some Americans need to increase total proteins, while others are eating more than is 
recommended (USDA, 2010). Total fats decrease in all simulations, while carbohydrates increase 
in three out of five tax scenarios (MEAT, ALL-ANIM and OPTIMAL), mainly because of the rise 
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in grains purchases. As the health concerns related to carbohydrates and total fats intake are mainly 
determined by some micronutrients included in these groups (i.e. added sugars, cholesterol and 
saturated fats), we defer more detailed comments to the next section. 
Regarding micronutrients, consistently with previous studies (i.e. (Edjabou and Smed 
2013; Briggs et al. 2013; Caillavet, Fadhuile, and Nichèle 2016; García-Muros et al. 2017; 
Revoredo-Giha, Chalmers, and Akaichi 2018; Dogbe and Gil 2018), we find that saturated fats 
and cholesterol significantly decrease in all simulated scenarios (on average -4% and -5% 
respectively), because of the reduction in animal-based products (mainly meat and cheese). 
Moreover, the consumption of sodium and alcohol falls too. As U.S. households consume an 
excessive amount of these nutrients, this outcome is considered as positive (USDA, 2010). On the 
other hand, added sugars decreases only in three out of five simulations. In the MEAT and 
OPTIMAL simulations, we detect an increase in added sugars (+1.7% and 1% respectively) which 
is mainly driven by the rise in the purchases of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) and also of 
sweets. A similar result was found by other authors, such as Edjabou and Smed (2013), Caillavet 
et al. (2016), Briggs et al. (2013 and 2016). According to (Briggs et al. 2016), this is because sugar 
production is a relatively low source of GHGEs and this is why they suggest to combine the carbon 
tax with a sales tax on SSBs.  
According to the USDA Dietary Guidelines, U.S. households should increase their intake 
of fiber, calcium, potassium and vitamin D to improve the quality of their diet. Looking at the 
second set of results in figure 1.9, we can see that the quantity of these nutrients declines under 
almost all simulated scenario, especially for calcium and vitamin D, as dairy products are the main 
sources of these nutrients and they are highly taxed in almost all scenarios. The only exception is 
fiber, as its intake significantly increases in almost all simulations, except for the ALL-FOOD one. 
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This is particularly true in the REV-NEUTR and OPTIMAL policy cases, as fruit and vegetable 
purchases rise thanks to the high subsidy rates. Similar results are found by other authors, such as 
(Briggs et al. 2013; Kehlbacher et al. 2016; García-Muros et al. 2017; Dogbe and Gil 2018).  
Overall, these results show that none of the tax scenarios strictly improves the diet of U.S. 
households by increasing the “healthy” micronutrients (i.e. fiber, calcium, potassium and vitamin 
D) and simultaneously decreasing the quantity of nutrients that are deleterious to health (saturated 
fats, cholesterol, added sugars, sodium and alcohol). However, on average, the total percentage 
reduction in unhealthy nutrients is below the one in healthy components, and this result can be 
interpreted as a marginal improvement in the composition of food purchases. Moreover, in our 
disaggregated results, we observe that lower socio-economic classes experience the greatest 
positive effects in terms of nutritional quality of the diet. 
The distributional implications of the carbon tax policies we analyze are derived by 
computing the Kakwani index for each simulated scenario. These results are shown in table 1.10.  
In all the cases, the Kakwani index is negative, meaning that all the policies are regressive as they 
affect poor people the most. These results are consistent with the ones from previous studies, such 
as Kehlbacher et al. (2016) and García-Muros et al. (2017). This is particularly true for the 
uncompensated scenarios (MEAT, ALL-ANIM, ALL-FOOD), where the index value is very close 
to -0.4. On the other hand, the two revenue-neutral policies (REV-NEUTR and OPTIMAL) are 
less regressive, as the index value is close to zero, with the REV-NEUTRAL policy almost being 
proportional. This outcome can be explained by the following reasons. First, poor people tend to 
spend a higher share of their income on food, and so, they are relatively more affected by a carbon 
tax on food acquisitions than relatively more affluent consumers. Moreover, they experience larger 
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percentage increases in prices after the tax introduction as they tend to buy cheaper products  than 
higher socio-economic classes (Kehlbacher et al. 2016).    
 
1.6 Conclusions, limitations, and discussion 
Our current dietary habits contribute significantly to anthropogenic GHGEs. Moreover, the 
expected population growth together with the rise in the demand for carbon-intensive foods (i.e. 
meat and dairy products) will also increase agriculture’s contribution to climate change (Caillavet 
et al., 2016). The objective of this chapter is, indeed, to evaluate how carbon taxes on food 
acquisitions may contribute to reduce GHGEs from the food system in the U.S. Given the 
controversial results obtained in previous papers that analyze the use of carbon taxes on food 
purchases in some European countries (i.e. Edjabou and Smed 2013; Briggs et al. 2016; Caillavet, 
Fadhuile, and Nichèle 2016; Kehlbacher et al. 2016; García-Muros et al. 2017; Revoredo-Giha, 
Chalmers, and Akaichi 2018), we also evaluate the unintended consequences of these policies in 
terms of consumer welfare, nutrition and social equity. 
In line with other studies, we find that carbon taxes can be an effective instrument to reduce 
GHGEs from food acquisitions (from -3% to -5%) and improve social welfare (from +57 to +101 
million dollars), thanks to the reduction in the external costs generated by GHGEs pollution The 
greatest GHGEs abatement is achieved when all foods are taxed (ALL-FOOD) (-5.2%) and is 
mainly driven by the striking decrease in the consumption of meat and dairy products. However, 
this policy is the most inefficient (-0.76$/kg of CO2eq), as it entails the biggest loss in consumer 
welfare per kilogram of CO2-eq reduction. On the other hand, a revenue neutral carbon tax policy 
(REV-NEUTRAL) might be more politically acceptable as it minimizes the impacts on consumers 
(-0.08$/kg of CO2eq). However, it fails to reach a significant reduction in GHGEs as the one 
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recommended in the first Kyoto’s protocol agreement (-4.3% vs -5%). This implies that a trade-
off exists between GHGEs abatement and consumer welfare. Moreover, in both cases, taxing 
and/or subsidizing all foods might be unrealistic as the administrative costs would be 
disproportionately high. In this regard, the OPTIMAL policy we suggest could be a more plausible 
and feasible alternative for achieving GHGEs objectives (-5%) at minimal consumer welfare loss 
(-$0.18/kg of CO2eq), without increasing the tax burden for U.S. households (revenue-neutral). 
Even though the primary objective of a carbon tax on food purchases is decreasing GHGEs, 
the impact on diet quality is also important because of the potential consequences on health. Our 
results show that the intake of nutrients that might be deleterious to health (i.e. cholesterol, 
saturated fats, alcohol and sodium) decreases under all simulated scenarios. However, this is not 
the case for added sugars in the MEAT and OPTIMAL simulations. The same result is found by 
other authors, such as Briggs et al. (2016), and can be explained by the low EIFs of food products 
that are rich in added sugars (mainly sugar-sweetened beverages and sweets). On the other hand, 
the total quantity of healthy nutrients (i.e. calcium, potassium and vitamin D) decreases too in 
almost all simulations, mainly because of the decline in the consumption of dairy products. The 
only exception is fiber, whose intake rises because of higher fruit and vegetable purchases. 
Furthermore, the fall in proteins that we detect after all the carbon taxes introduction might be of 
concern given that many U.S. households do not consume enough proteins. This is mainly due to 
the high tax rates on foods that are rich in animal proteins, like meat and dairy products. Overall, 
these outcomes show how environmental and nutritional objectives are not always aligned. 
However, in all simulations we also observe that, on average, the total percentage reduction in 
unhealthy nutrients is below the one in healthy components, and this result can be interpreted as a 
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marginal improvement in the composition of food purchases. This is particularly true for U.S. 
households in the lowest socio-economic classes.  
Focusing on the distributional implications, consistently with previous studies (i.e. 
Kehlbacher et al. 2016; García-Muros et al. 2017) we find that carbon taxes on food purchases are 
regressive, as the Kakwani index is negative in all the cases we analyze. So, despite having the 
greatest diet improvement, poor households are also the most burdened by these policies. This is 
because they spend a larger share of their income on food purchases and they buy cheaper products, 
and so, they experience relatively larger price increases than more affluent consumers. However, 
we also find that the Kakwani index values in the REV-NEUTRAL and OPTIMAL scenarios are 
very close to zero (-0.05 and -0.10 respectively), meaning that it is possible to design a carbon-
based food tax that is almost neutral in terms of social equity by re-distributing the tax revenues in 
the form of food subsidies. 
In summary, our results show that carbon-based food taxation might be an effective tool 
for reducing GHGEs in the U.S. However, consistently with previous studies, we find that trade-
offs exist among environmental, nutritional and distributional goals. Therefore, encouraging a 
sustainable and healthy diet without increasing social disparities might be challenging. A revenue-
neutral policy with high tax rates on meat products and subsidies on vegetables as the one we 
simulate in the OPTIMAL scenario might be a starting point for policy makers desiring to help 
steer consumers of all income levels to diets which are low-carbon and nutritionally adequate. 
Nevertheless, additional policies might be needed to avoid negative consequences on health (i.e. 
tax on added sugars and nutrition education campaigns). 
This study is not without limitations. As the AIDS model is a special case of the Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model, one should test which model fits the data better. 
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In details, if the coefficients for the squared total expenditure term under the QUAIDS model 
specification (λi) are not statistically different from zero, one can argue that the QUAIDS model 
reduces to the AIDS model (Gostkowski 2018). Our results show that all λi’s are not statistically 
different from zero, except for the soft-drinks and alcohol food categories. A similar result for 
alcohol is found by Banks et al. (1997). Furthermore, the results from the Wald test show that these 
coefficients are not simultaneously equal to zero. As a consequence, future research should 
evaluate how the results from this analysis would be affected by a different demand model 
specification (i.e. QUAIDS).  
Then, there are some data limitations. As noted by Boehm et al. (2018), USDA analyses 
reveal that food acquisitions are underreported in FoodAPS, particularly toward the end of the 
survey period. Moreover, the price elasticity values we estimate should be considered to be in the 
upper-end as they are based on FoodAPS weekly observations, and so, they reflect consumer price-
reaction in the short-term. Future work should focus on food consumption rather than food 
acquisitions to derive more accurate estimates of the nutritional consequences of the carbon 
policies, and also, should account for food-away-from-home (FAFH) purchases. To complete the 
welfare analysis for U.S. households, it would also be of interest to obtain monetary values for the 
health effects deriving from the overall improvement in nutritional quality of food choices. 
 Focusing on the EIO-LCA method, because of data unavailability, we have to assume that 
imported food products are characterized by the same level of emissions as domestically-produced 
foods. In addition, some aggregations issues are there. For example, it is not possible to estimate 
GHGEs from beef and pork meat separately, as they belong to the same BEA manufacturing 
industry (i.e. “animal production, except cattle and poultry and eggs”). However, the carbon 
footprint of beef is much higher than the one of pork.  
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Finally, another limitation of this study is that we assume that supply is perfectly inelastic, 
and so, we ignore the potential strategic reaction of producers after the policies introduction. Future 
research should relax this assumption. 
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Table 1.1 Food groups definition. 
 *Following the USDA food coding scheme, mixed dishes are assigned to a group based on the primary component 
or ingredient in the mixture. For more information see: 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/tutorials/Dietary/SurveyOrientation/ResourceDietaryAnalysis/Info2.htm 
 
 
 
 
Name Description 
Milk and yogurt Milk, flavored milk, dairy drinks, yogurt 
Cheese and other dairy products 
Cheese, cottage and ricotta cheese, sour cream and 
cream cheese, butter and other animal fats 
Meat 
Beef, ground beef, veal, pork, lamb, goat, game, cold 
cuts and cured meat, liver and organs, bacon, 
frankfurters and sausages, meat mixed dishes* 
Poultry and eggs 
Chicken whole pieces, nuggets and tenders, turkey, 
duck and other poultry, cold cuts and cured meat, liver 
and organs, frankfurters, sausages, poultry mixed 
dishes*, eggs 
Fish Fish, shellfish, seafood mixed dishes* 
Plant-based protein foods 
Milk substitutes, beans, peas, legumes, nuts and seeds, 
processed soy products 
Grains 
Rice, pasta, cooked grains, bread, bagels, English 
muffins, quick bread, pancakes, waffles, ready to eat 
cereals, cooked cereals, grain based mixed dishes* 
Vegetables 
Vegetables except potatoes, olives, pickles and pickled 
vegetables, vegetable mixed dishes* 
Potatoes 
Potatoes, baked and boiled potatoes, French fries, 
mashed potatoes 
Fruits Fruits and fruit juices 
Salty snacks Potato chips, tortilla, popcorn, pretzels, crackers 
Sweets 
Biscuits, muffins, cereal bars, cakes and pies, cookies, 
doughnuts, pastries, ice-cream, pudding, gelatins, 
sugar, honey, jam, syrups, toppings 
Water and coffee Plain water, flavored or enhanced water, coffee and tea 
Soft-drinks Sweetened beverages and diet beverages 
Alcoholic beverages Beer, wine and liquor 
Others 
Salad dressings and vegetable oils, tomato-based and 
soy-based condiments, mustard, dips and gravies 
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Table 1.2 Average expenditure share and price ($/kg) by food category. 
Food category Share  Price 
Milk and yogurt 4.0% 1.7 
Cheese  3.1% 8.5 
Meat 11.3% 10.3 
Poultry and eggs 6.0% 6.8 
Fish 1.9% 12.6 
Plant-based protein foods 3.0% 6.6 
Grains 7.8% 4.8 
Vegetables 4.9% 4.1 
Potatoes 1.2% 2.7 
Fruits 4.1% 4.4 
Salty snacks 3.8% 8.6 
Sweets 9.3% 7.3 
Water and coffee 21.7% 8.7 
Soft-drinks 8.9% 2.0 
Alcoholic beverages 3.0% 6.7 
Others 5.8% 7.0 
Source: Author’s elaboration of FoodAPS data. 
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Table 1.3 Emissions intensity factor (EIF) by food industry. 
Industry name Industry code 
EIF  
(kg of CO2eq/$) 
Beef cattle ranching and farming, including feedlots and 
dual-purpose ranching and farming 
1121A0 2.749 
Dairy cattle and milk production 112120 2.295 
Grain farming 1111B0 1.318 
Animal production, except cattle and poultry and eggs 112A00 0.991 
Other crop farming 111900 0.895 
Wet corn milling 311221 0.769 
Greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture production 111400 0.547 
Oilseed farming 1111A0 0.407 
Vegetable and melon farming 111200 0.310 
Poultry and egg production 112300 0.271 
Fruit and tree nut farming 111300 0.226 
Sugar and confectionery product manufacturing 311300 0.129 
Breakfast cereal manufacturing 311230 0.113 
Fruit and vegetable canning, pickling, and drying 311420 0.107 
Flour milling and malt manufacturing 311210 0.080 
Seafood product preparation and packaging 311700 0.062 
Frozen food manufacturing 311410 0.056 
Dry, condensed, and evaporated dairy product 
manufacturing 311514 0.053 
Snack food manufacturing 311910 0.051 
Fats and oils refining and blending 311225 0.051 
Bread and bakery product manufacturing 311810 0.048 
Cookie, cracker, pasta, and tortilla manufacturing 3118A0 0.039 
Soybean and other oilseed processing 31122A 0.037 
Poultry processing 311615 0.037 
Ice cream and frozen dessert manufacturing 311520 0.034 
All other food manufacturing 311990 0.033 
Animal (except poultry) slaughtering, rendering, and 
processing 31161A 0.031 
Coffee and tea manufacturing 311920 0.030 
Fluid milk and butter manufacturing 31151A 0.028 
Breweries 312120 0.027 
Cheese manufacturing 311513 0.025 
Soft drink and ice manufacturing 312110 0.023 
Flavoring syrup and concentrate manufacturing 311930 0.022 
Seasoning and dressing manufacturing 311940 0.015 
Distilleries 312140 0.013 
Wineries 312130 0.011 
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Table 1.4 Average emission intensity factor (EIF) and share of total GHGEs from food 
acquisition by food category.  
Food category 
EIF                  
(kg of CO2-eq/$) 
GHGEs share 
Milk and yogurt 1.85 9.1% 
Cheese  1.98 8.5% 
Meat 2.33 19.4% 
Poultry and eggs 1.03 5.9% 
Fish 0.57 0.9% 
Plant-based protein foods 0.99 3.7% 
Grains 0.82 12.0% 
Vegetables 0.86 9.2% 
Potatoes 0.83 1.2% 
Fruits 0.59 3.9% 
Salty snacks 0.65 3.4% 
Sweets 0.77 9.1% 
Water and coffee 0.59 1.5% 
Soft-drinks 0.65 5.6% 
Alcoholic beverages 0.47 0.4% 
Others 0.87 6.2% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of FoodAPS data
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Table 1.5 Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model estimation results. 
  Milk Cheese Meat Poultry Fish PBPF Grains Veg Potatoes Fruit Snacks Sweets Water  SSBs Alc Others 
PMilk -0.064*** 0.007* -0.007 0.002 0.011** 0.008** 0.008 0.015** -0.001 0.007 0.002 0.020*** -0.004 0.004 -0.011 0.001 
PCheese 0.007* -0.040*** 0.020*** 0.015** -0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.010** -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.003 0.003 
PMeat -0.007 0.020*** 
-
0.104*** 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.025*** 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.017** 0.003 0.008 -0.010* 0.011** 
PPoultr 0.002 0.015** 0.006 -0.012* -0.009 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.007 
PFish 0.011** -0.001 0.004 -0.009 
-
0.016*** -0.007* 0.000 0.010* 0.002 0.008 0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.004 
PPBPF 0.008** 0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.007* 
-
0.023*** -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.005*** 0.001 0.007** 0.003 
PGrains 0.008 0.007 0.025*** -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.045*** 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 -0.006 
PVeg 0.015*** -0.003 0.006 0.001 0.010* 0.005 0.000 -0.027*** -0.005* -0.011** -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.013*** 
PPotatoes -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005* -0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 
PFruit 0.007 0.003 0.008 -0.006 0.008 0.004 0.003 -0.011** 0.001 -0.008*** -0.012** -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.004 
PSnacks 0.002 -0.010** 0.009 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 0.007 -0.003* 0.001 -0.006 0.002 
PSweets 0.020*** -0.003 0.017** -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.007 
-
0.014*** -0.006** 0.014** -0.005 -0.008* 
PWater -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.006** 0.001 -0.005* 0.001 -0.002 
PSSBs 0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.014** -0.005* -0.021*** 0.003 -0.001 
PAlc -0.011 0.003 -0.010** 0.004 -0.005 0.007** 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.002 
POthers 0.001 0.003 0.011** -0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.013*** 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.008* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017*** 
Exp -0.021*** -0.006*** 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.016*** 
-
0.016*** 
-
0.010*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.003*** -0.011*** 
-
0.020*** 
-
0.027*** 
-
0.016*** -0.008*** -0.032*** -0.007*** 
Cons 0.057*** 0.076*** 0.206*** 0.117*** 0.091*** 0.083*** 0.145*** 0.114*** 0.027*** 0.109*** 0.073*** 0.195*** 0.082*** 0.113*** 0.075*** 0.068*** 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Time and region fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
Milk=milk and yogurt; Cheese=cheese and other dairy products; PBPF=plant-based protein foods; Poultry=poultry and eggs; Veg=Vegetables, 
Water=water, coffee and tea; SSBs=sugar sweetened beverages; Alc= alcoholic beverages; Others=residual category; Exp=food expenditure. 
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Table 1.6 Uncompensated own-price and cross-price elasticities. 
  Milk Cheese Meat Poultry Fish VBP Grains Vegetables Potatoes Fruit Snacks Sweets Water  SSBs Alc Others 
PMilk -1.094*** 0.015 0.086 0.039 0.014 0.016 0.037 0.014* 0.011 0.027 0.022 0.035 0.036* 0.033 0.047* 0.022 
PCheese 0.042 -1.522*** 0.276*** 0.202** -0.011 0.047 0.098 -0.037 0.036 0.042 -0.121* -0.020 0.005 -0.050 0.047 0.046 
PMeat 0.055*** 0.098*** -1.494*** 0.033 0.023 0.028 0.126*** 0.032 0.002 0.042 0.049* 0.091*** 0.020** 0.042 -0.045 -0.058* 
PPoultry -0.053*** 0.135** 0.077 -1.085*** -0.062 0.040 0.006 0.029 0.013 -0.035 0.047 -0.030 0.041** 0.036 0.043 -0.063 
PFish 0.054 -0.001 0.080 -0.075 -1.166*** -0.060* 0.024 0.134* 0.027 0.103 0.084 -0.036 0.008 0.031 -0.041 0.015 
PVBP 0.040** 0.046 0.084 0.054 -0.071 -1.270*** -0.021 0.077 -0.024 0.058 -0.030 -0.030 0.073*** 0.020 0.089* 0.026 
PGrains -0.034*** 0.051 0.184*** -0.003 0.005 -0.016 -1.301*** 0.008 -0.002 0.028 0.029 0.009 0.019 0.024 0.054* 0.017 
PVegetables 0.120 -0.021 0.074 0.027 0.101** 0.057 0.017 -1.225*** -0.042 -0.083* -0.016 0.012 0.011* -0.028 0.055 0.064*** 
PPotatoes 0.087** 0.102 0.023 0.049 0.084 -0.075 -0.007 -0.177 -1.269*** 0.054 0.046 0.041 0.062 0.160 0.005 -0.088 
PFruit 0.048** 0.031 0.090 -0.043 0.078* 0.043 0.041 -0.089* 0.014 -1.064*** -0.105* -0.002 0.024 -0.028 0.053* 0.008 
PSnacks 0.042* -0.111** 0.188* 0.093 0.114 -0.021 0.088 -0.007 0.022 -0.138 -0.965*** 0.145* -0.024 0.049 -0.062 -0.131 
PSweets -0.030*** -0.003 0.117** -0.018 -0.020 -0.011 0.017 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.044** -1.044*** -0.018 0.086** -0.017 0.021 
PWater -0.007*** 0.014 0.082 0.065* 0.011 0.081*** 0.052 0.023 0.023 0.043 -0.027 -0.033 -0.966*** -0.036* 0.027 -0.155* 
PSSBs -0.004** -0.035 0.082 0.029 0.015 0.010 0.030 -0.034 0.038** -0.030 0.016 0.134 -0.036*** -1.179*** 0.032 0.000 
PAlc -0.003*** 0.073 -0.045 0.100 -0.028 0.124** 0.155 0.118* 0.011 0.113* -0.050 0.010 0.048 0.087 -0.901*** -0.390 
POthers -0.037** 0.048 0.178** -0.096* 0.064 0.047 -0.068 0.196*** 0.035 0.077 0.032 -0.093 -0.016 -0.004 -0.027 -1.236*** 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Milk=milk and yogurt; Cheese=cheese and other dairy products; PBPF=plant-based protein foods; Poultry=poultry and eggs; Water=water, coffee and 
tea; SSBs=sugar sweetened beverages; Alc= alcoholic beverages Others=residual category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 1.7 Expenditure elasticities. 
Food category Elasticity 
Milk and yogurt  0.641*** 
Cheese and other dairy products 0.918*** 
Meat 0.956*** 
Poultry and eggs 0.860*** 
Fish 0.820*** 
Plant-based protein foods 0.881*** 
Grains 0.929*** 
Vegetables 0.876*** 
Potatoes 0.903*** 
Fruits  0.903*** 
Snacks 0.718*** 
Sweets 0.859*** 
Water and coffee 0.804*** 
Soft-drinks 0.932*** 
Alcoholic beverages 0.579*** 
Others 0.900*** 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 1.8 Price changes under alternative tax scenarios. 
  MEAT ALL-ANIM ALL-FOOD REV-NEUTR OPTIMAL 
Milk  0.0% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 0.0% 
Cheese 0.0% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 0.0% 
Meat 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 16.8% 
Poultry 0.0% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 0.0% 
Fish 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% -20.0% -0.4% 
PBPF 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% -20.0% 0.0% 
Grains 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 3.3% 0.0% 
Vegetables 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% -19.5% -13.9% 
Potatoes 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 3.3% 0.0% 
Fruits  0.0% 0.0% 2.4% -19.3% 0.0% 
Snacks 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 
Sweets 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 
Water 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 2.4% 0.0% 
SSBs 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 2.7% 0.0% 
Alcohol 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 1.9% 0.0% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 3.6% 0.0% 
See section 1.4.2. for a detailed description of each scenario. 
Taxes are positives, subsidies are negative. 
Milk=milk and yogurt; Cheese=cheese and other dairy products; PBPF=plant-based protein foods; Poultry=poultry 
and eggs; Water=water, coffee and tea; SSBs=sugar sweetened beverages; Alcohol= alcoholic beverages; 
Others=residual category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Figure 1.1 Percentage change in foods consumption and total expenditure under alternative tax scenarios. 
 
Milk=milk and yogurt; Cheese=cheese and other dairy products; PBPF=plant-based protein foods; Poultry=poultry and eggs; Water=water, coffee and tea; 
SSBs=sugar sweetened beverages; Alcohol= alcoholic beverages; Others=residual category. 
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Figure 1.2 Percentage change in carbon footprint with respect to the baseline by tax scenario. 
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Table 1.9 Calculated changes in consumer surplus and social welfare, and efficiency by tax scenario. 
  MEAT ALL-ANIM ALL-FOOD REV-NEUTR OPTIMAL 
Consumer surplus1 -964 -1723 -3782 -433 -916 
Social welfare1 57 77 101 84 95 
Efficiency2 0.35 0.45 0.76 0.08 0.18 
1 $ millions/population/year. 
2$/kg of CO2-eq.  
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Figure 1.3 Percentage change in macronutrients intake by tax scenario. 
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Figure 1.4 Percentage change in micronutrients intake by tax scenario. 
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Table 1.10 Kakwani index by simulated scenario. 
  MEAT ALL-ANIM ALL-FOOD REV-NEUTR OPTIMAL 
Kakwani index -0.40 -0.37 -0.36 -0.05 -0.10 
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Chapter 2 
 
Welfare Implications of Private Label Introduction in a Differentiated Market 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Private labels (herein PL), or store brands, are all the products sold under a retail chain’s 
name. In many modern food markets, retailers use PL products to capture part of consumer 
demand, increase sales and gain relative power over all agents involved in the supply chain. First 
introduced as relatively low-cost and low-quality alternatives to national brands (herein NB), PLs 
have gradually entered premium-priced segments (i.e. multi-tiers and health differentiated PLs) 
(Steiner 2004; Ying and Anders 2013; Amaldoss and Shin 2015; Caprice 2017) and gained 
sizeable market shares. In 2016, the market share for PLs in Europe accounted for more than 30% 
of sales (PLMA 2017).  
According to the conventional economic wisdom, the introduction of new products as PLs 
could affect both consumer and producer welfare. From the consumer side, we can think of two 
effects: the variety effect and price effect. When a new product is launched, consumers can benefit 
from the availability of an additional product with different characteristics (“variety effect”), and, 
at the same time, market prices should fall due to enhanced competition on the supply side (“price 
effect”) (Hausman and Leonard 2002). We expect the introduction of PLs to result in a “price 
effect” greater than that of a NB entry, since PLs decrease manufacturers’ bargaining power, 
lowering the possibility of a “double-marginalization issue” within the supply chain (Mills 1995; 
Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 1999; Caprice 2017). However, several empirical studies 
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show mixed evidence in terms of NBs’ price reaction to PL development. In particular, some of 
them find a negative correlation between PL entry and market share and NB prices (Putsis 1997; 
Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; Sckokai and Soregaroli 
2008), while others get the opposite result, even after controlling for product differentiation (Putsis 
1997; Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Ward et al. 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; 
Bontemps et al. 2005; Bontemps, Orozco, and Réquillart 2008; Sckokai and Soregaroli 2008). 
Moreover, the “variety effect” might not be significant if there is already excess product variety in 
the market, as products become more substitutable and consumers’ willingness to pay for 
additional choice decreases (Ackerberg and Rysman 2005); this may be particularly true for PLs 
since they are often copycat alternatives to NBs (Bunte et al. 2011). 
On the other hand, the launch of a new product should affect producers’ surplus, enhancing 
competition and leading to lower prices and profits (Kim 2004). However, previous empirical 
studies show that the overall impact of PL entry on NBs’ profits varies across manufacturers. For 
example, Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) find that while second-tier NBs are worse off after PL 
introduction, premium NBs are better off. This result may be related to PLs’ positioning and 
differences in the extent of the loyal customer base among NBs (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002; 
Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004; Pauwels and Srinivasan 2004; Gabrielsen and Sørgard 2007; 
Richards, Hamilton, and Patterson 2010). 
Therefore, the impact of PL introduction on welfare is an empirical question. The objective 
of this chapter is to evaluate how PL entry affects consumers’ and producers’ surplus and to 
determine whether these products are social welfare-enhancing or anti-competitive. Moreover, we 
want to evaluate whether the welfare implications of PL development differ across horizontally 
and vertically differentiated market segments.  
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We contribute to the existing body of literature on PLs in several ways. While some 
previous studies evaluate the effects of PL entry on consumer welfare and profits in the U.S. 
(Pauwels and Srinivasan 2004; Cohen and Cotterill 2011), to the best of our knowledge this is a 
first empirical application for Europe, the world’s most advanced and sophisticated PL region 
(IPLC, 2008). Secondly, this is the first study that distinguishes among horizontally and vertical 
differentiated market segments. Finally, we provide an estimate of the two components of the 
change in consumer welfare (“price effect” and “variety effect”) and account for the potential 
“excess variety” in the market.  
In our empirical application, we focus on the Italian yogurt market, since it is both 
horizontally (i.e. regular yogurt) and vertically differentiated (i.e. functional products that carry 
health claims), and PLs have significant presence in both segments. Using retailer scanner data for 
yogurt sales (IRI Infoscan) for a 24-month period (January 2006-December 2007) in 17 Italian 
regions, we estimate consumer demand, applying the random coefficient logit model of demand 
(Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995). Assuming a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and a fixed mark-up 
rule for retailers, we recover the marginal costs and price-cost margins for each product in the 
market. Then, we use the estimated demand parameters and marginal costs to carry out different 
simulations in which we assume PLs were not introduced in the horizontally or vertically 
differentiated segment or in the entire yogurt market, respectively. Using the new equilibrium 
prices and market share derived under counterfactual scenarios, we determine the change in 
producer and consumer surplus due to PL withdrawal from the market. The change in consumer 
welfare is estimated through the compensating variation (CV). We then apply the method 
suggested by Hausmann and Leonard (2002) to disaggregate the total CV into the “price effect” 
and “variety effect.” 
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Our analysis finds that, overall, PLs are social-welfare enhancing. The effect on welfare is 
highest when PLs disappear from the entire yogurt market, and lowest when PLs are only 
withdrawn from the vertically differentiated segment (functional yogurt). In all the simulated 
scenarios we notice that, in the absence of PLs, NB equilibrium prices would be higher, and the 
price reaction would be particularly strong for second-tier NBs. We also find that the exit of a PL 
would lead to an increase in producers’ profits due to expanded sales. However, producer surplus 
would be lower as PL profits would only be partially distributed across NB products. For 
consumers, consistent with the conventional economic wisdom, we find that the exit of a PL would 
cause a decline in welfare due to the smaller number of products available in the market (“variety 
effect”) and the price increase (“price effect”). We also observe that PLs are more pro-competitive 
when they are introduced in a vertically differentiated segment rather than in a horizontally 
differentiated one, as the price effect is higher in percentage terms when PLs disappear from the 
functional yogurt market. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the existing 
literature on the effects of PL introduction, while in section 2.3 we define our demand and supply 
side model specification and simulations approach. In section 2.4, we describe the data and 
estimation method, while in section 2.5 we discuss our empirical results. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
The dramatic increase of PL shares has led many authors to investigate the effects of their 
development on all market players. Several studies analyze the determinants of PL introduction 
and success (Hoch and Banerji 1993; Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995; Dhar and Hoch 1997), 
the strategic positioning of PLs (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002; Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 
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2004; Richards, Hamilton, and Patterson 2010), their impact on the retailer-manufacturer strategic 
interaction and profit-sharing (Mills 1995; Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 1999; 
Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 2000; Cotterill and Samson 2002; Steiner 2004; Draganska, Klapper, 
and Villas-Boas 2009) and on market prices (Mills 1995; Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 
1999; Ward et al. 2002; Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Bergès-Sennou, Bontems, and 
Réquillart 2004; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; Bontemps et al. 2005; Bontemps, Orozco, and 
Réquillart 2008; Sckokai and Soregaroli 2008; Castellari et al. 2014). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, only few empirical studies investigate the effect of PL introduction on producer and 
consumer surplus and social welfare.  
According to the conventional theoretical literature on this topic (Mills 1995; Bontems, 
Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 1999; Bergès-Sennou, Bontems, and Réquillart 2004), social 
welfare should rise after PL entry, as store brand marketing improves the overall performance of 
the distribution channel and lessens the “double-marginalization” problem. On the other hand, PL 
introduction weakens NB manufacturers’ bargaining position vis-à-vis retailers, lowering their 
wholesale prices and profits (Mills 1995; Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 1999). Finally, 
all consumers should be better off in a mixed regimen where NBs and PLs compete with each 
other, because price-conscious consumers benefit from the availability of relatively cheaper PL 
alternatives, while those who buy NB products pay less than they would in the absence of store 
brands (Mills 1995; Steiner 2004).  
However, results from empirical studies on this issue are ambiguous. Consistent with these 
theoretical predictions, some studies show that NB prices decrease after PL introduction (Putsis 
1997; Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; Sckokai and 
Soregaroli 2008). On the other hand, several authors find a positive correlation between NB prices 
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and PL development and expansion, even after controlling for product differentiation (Putsis 1997; 
Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song 2002; Ward et al. 2002; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; Bontemps 
et al. 2005; Bontemps, Orozco, and Réquillart 2008; Sckokai and Soregaroli 2008).  
According to Gabrielsen and Sorgard (2007), retail prices on NBs may increase after PLs 
launch, as brand-name manufacturers may choose the more profitable strategy of focusing only on 
loyal customers, setting higher prices, and not serving the switching segment. This is consistent 
with single-dimension spatial models of product differentiation, where the incumbents have no 
incentives to try to attract with low prices consumers who are located relatively far from their 
products in the characteristics space once a new product is introduced (Ward et al., 2002). In this 
case, the overall impact on consumer surplus is uncertain, as loyal consumers are worse off because 
of higher NB prices, while switching customers are better off given the availability of a cheaper 
PL. 
To the best of our knowledge, few empirical studies evaluate the impacts of PL 
development on all market players. Chintagunta et al. (2002) investigate the effects of store-brand 
entry on the demand and supply sides in the U.S. oat product category. On the supply side, they 
find that PL development leads to lower retail prices and improves the retailer’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis manufacturers and margins. On the demand side, their results show that consumers’ 
preferences for NBs are not affected by PL introduction, although price sensitivity in the category 
increases. 
Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) evaluate the effects of PL entry on the performance of all 
market players (retailers, manufacturers and consumers) by carrying out a multivariate time-series 
analysis on scanner data for several product categories from one of the largest supermarket chains 
in the Chicago area. Their results show that retailers benefit from PL development because they 
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ensure high unit margins and strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis NBs. For 
manufacturers, we must distinguish among premium and second-tier NBs, as store brand entry is 
usually beneficial for the former but not for the latter. This outcome can be explained by the 
relative positioning of PL products because second-tier NBs are usually closer to store brands in 
the characteristics space than the market leaders, and thus are more affected by their introduction. 
As a consequence, premium NBs can accommodate PL entry by focusing on the quality-conscious 
customers and setting higher prices, and their revenues do not decrease as they do not experience 
losses in sales volume. On the other hand, second-tier brands have to adopt a more defensive 
strategy and lower their prices, and their revenues decrease. Finally, consumers are positively 
affected by PL development because of a wider product assortment and additional promotional 
activities. However, as mentioned above, they do not get lower prices on all NBs, only on some 
second-tier brands.  
Cohen and Cotterill (2011) estimate the effects of PL introduction in the fluid milk market 
in the Boston area. They use the estimated demand parameters from a random coefficients logit 
model and their assumptions on market conduct (i.e. milk manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders 
and retailers purchase PL milk at cost) to simulate a counterfactual equilibrium without store 
brands and derive welfare implications. They find that consumer surplus (-11%) would be lower 
if store brands were eliminated in all chains because of higher equilibrium prices on NBs. On the 
other hand, manufacturers’ margins and profits would be higher due to a reduction in competition. 
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2.3 Model 
2.3.1 Utility and demand specification 
The demand for yogurt is modelled according to the random coefficients logit model of 
demand developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (herein BLP). This model solves the 
dimensionality issue of differentiated markets by projecting the products into the characteristics 
space and represents consumer preference as a function of product attributes as well as consumers’ 
characteristics (Nevo 2000; Kim 2004). The indirect utility that each consumer i gets from the 
consumption of product j in market m is a function of its price (pjm), the observed and unobserved 
(by the econometrician) product characteristics (Xjm, ξjm) and the unknown parameters of the 
model, (αi, β, ϒ) (Nevo 2000; Kim 2004): 
                                Uijm= αipjm + βXjm+ ξjm + ϒln(Nm) + εijm                                                        (2.1) 
where ln(Nm) is the natural logarithm of the number of products available in the market (Nm) to 
account for the potential congestion of the characteristics space and avoid the overestimation of 
the welfare effects due to new product introduction, as suggested by Ackerberg and Rysman 
(2005), and εijm is a mean zero stochastic term that is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) with an extreme value type I distribution (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; 
Nevo 2000). In our empirical application, Xjm includes observable yogurt attributes, such as fat 
content (whole vs. low-fat), flavor (plain, fruit, other flavors), segment (regular vs. functional), 
vendor name (vendor 1 to vendor 9 and PLs), a dummy variable if the product is in drinkable 
format, health claim type (health support vs. reduction of cardiovascular disease risk) and fixed 
effects for location and seasonality. We also include a drinkable indicator and a dummy variable 
for functional PL products to assess potential differences in consumers’ evaluation for PLs across 
segments.  
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The random parameter αi represents the marginal utility of income and is introduced in the 
model to account for the potential heterogeneity of individual preferences for price (Kim, 2004). 
Following Nevo (2000), the distribution of the consumers’ taste parameter for price is modeled as 
follows: 
                                                   αi= α + σvi,    vi~Pv(v)                                                                                (2.2) 
where α represents the mean preference for price and is common to all consumers, vi is a vector of 
unobserved demographic characteristics that follows a known parametric distribution Pv(v). For 
simplicity, we assume Pv(v) is a standard normal distribution. 
Therefore, the utility that consumer i can get from product j as in (2.1) can be divided into 
two parts: a mean utility component, δj, which is product-specific and common to all households, 
and a mean-zero heteroskedastic deviation from the mean, uijm+εijm, which captures the effect of 
the random coefficients: 
                                                Uijm= δjm + uijm + εijm                                                                                   (2.3) 
 where 
                                               δjm= αpjm + βXjm + ξjm                                                                        (2.4) 
                                                          uijm= σvipjm                                                                                (2.5) 
uijm depends on the interaction between the consumer’s unobservable characteristics (vi) and the 
price and is unique to each household (Nevo 2001; Kim 2004). 
Each of the M consumers may choose among the J products in the sample or not buy any 
of them, resulting in J+1 alternatives. As a consequence, an outside good has to be introduced in 
the model and its mean utility (δ0) is normalized to zero. Without the outside good, a homogenous 
price increase of all the products would result in no changes in quantities purchased (Nevo 2000; 
Kim 2004).  
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The model further assumes that each consumer buys only one unit of the good that provides 
her with the highest utility and that ties occur with zero probability. As εijm is assumed to be i.i.d 
with type I extreme value distribution, the probability that consumer i purchases product j in market 
m, Prijm, is computed as follows (Xiao 2008; Zheng and Huang 2014):     
                                        Prijm= 
exp (δjm+uijm(𝑣))
1+ ∑ (δrm+uirm(𝑣))
𝐽
𝑟=1
                                                   (2.6) 
This specification produces a mixed logit model that generates rich substitution patterns 
between choices. Integrating over the population distribution function, iϵM, we get an expression 
for the market share of each product j in market m that is defined as (Xiao 2008; Zheng and Huang 
2014): 
                      sjm= ∫ Prijm 𝑑P𝑣(𝑣)  =∫
exp (δjm+uijm(𝑣))
1+ ∑ (δrm+uirm(𝑣))
𝐽
𝑟=1
 dPv(v)                             (2.7) 
As the integral in (2.7) does not have an analytic closed form and is difficult to compute, 
it can be approximated through a simulation estimator that uses the empirical distribution from ns 
pseudo-random draws of v instead of the population density, Pv(v) (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
1995; Nevo 2000): 
                             sjm=
1
𝑛𝑠
∑ Prijm
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1  = 
1
𝑛𝑠
∑
exp (δjm+uijm(𝑣))
1+ ∑ (δrm+uirm(𝑣))
𝐽
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1                           (2.8) 
Each individual i has different price sensitivity for each product j. The price elasticity of 
the market shares, sjm, for each product j with respect to the price of product k in market m, pkm, 
can be computed integrating over all consumers as follows: 
                            ηjkm= 
∂sjm
∂pkm
·
pkm
sjm
{
−pjm
sjm
 ∫ αi sijm 
(1 − sijm) dPv(v)   if j = k,
pkm
sjm
 ∫ αi sijm sikm dPv(v)               otherwise     
                        (2.9) 
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where sijm is equal to the probability of consumer i purchasing product j in market m (Nevo, 2000; 
Zheng and Huang 2014).  
 
2.3.2 Supply side 
Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001), we assume that the profit 
of each multiproduct firm f that produces a subset Jf of the J products in the market is defined as:                                                  
                                      Π f = ΣjϵJf  (pj - mcj) Msj(p, X, ξ; θ) - Cf                                                   (2.10) 
where pj and mcj are the price and marginal cost of product j respectively, M is the market size, sj 
is the market share of brand j, θ includes the estimated demand parameters and Cf are the fixed 
costs of production.  
Under the assumption of a pure-strategy Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, firms simultaneously 
choose prices to maximize profits from all the Jf products, yielding the following first order 
conditions: 
                              
∂Π𝑓 
∂pj
= sj(•) + ΣrϵJf (pr - mcr) 
∂sr(•)
∂pj
 = 0,    for all jϵJf                       (2.11) 
That can be re-written in matrix form: 
                                                  s(•) - Ω(p) Ʌ(p-mc)= 0                                             (2.12) 
where Ω(p) is the matrix of partial derivatives of the market shares with respect to prices, while Ʌ 
is the market structure matrix whose elements are defined as follows (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
1995; Xiao 2008): 
                                             Ωrj(p)=  −
∂sr(•)
∂pj
,   for each j, r ϵJf                                   (2.13)            
                                                    Ʌjr={
1  if r, j ϵ Jf      
0   otherwise
                                                    (2.14) 
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The price-cost margin and marginal cost for each brand j can be recovered by solving the 
system of equations in (2.12): 
                                                (p-mc)= (Ω(p) Ʌ)-1 s(•)                                                (2.15) 
                                                 mc= p - (Ω(p) Ʌ)-1 s(•)                                                (2.16) 
As data about wholesale prices are not available, we assume a constant mark-up rule for 
the retailer. Hausmann and Leonard (2002) show that retail prices and demand elasticities can be 
used to approximate manufacturers’ first order condition under this assumption. 
 
2.3.3 Counterfactual simulations and welfare analysis approach 
To evaluate the welfare implications of PL introduction, we carry out three simulations. In 
the first and second ones, we assume that PLs were not introduced in the horizontally differentiated 
(regular yogurt) or in the vertically differentiated (functional yogurt) segment, respectively, while 
in the third one, we simulate as if PLs had not been introduced in the entire yogurt market.  
Since fewer brands are available in the market, the probability of each consumer buying 
brand j, and so, its market share, sj, changes. Assuming constant marginal costs for each firm, the 
counterfactual prices, pcf, can be recovered solving the system of equations defined in (2.12):  
                                                      pcf= mc + (Ω(pcf) Ʌcf)-1 s(pcf, X, ξ; θ)                                                        (2.17) 
where Ʌcf is the assumed market structure matrix in the PLs withdrawal scenario (Kim 2004; 
Knittel and Metaxoglou 2014).  
Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) suggest an approximate solution for the counterfactual 
prices, pappr, to avoid the potential issues related to the instabilities of Newton routines used to 
solve systems of nonlinear equations and to the existence of an equilibrium:                                                
                                      pappr= mc + (Ω(p) Ʌcf)-1 s(pcf, X, ξ; θ)                                                (2.18)                  
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where the elements of Ω(p) are evaluated at the original equilibrium prices, p.                      
The new equilibrium prices and shares can then be used to compute the change in profits 
for each firm f: 
                              ∆Πf = ΣjϵJ’f Πf (pappr, mc, θ) - ΣjϵJf Πf (p, mc, θ)                               (2.19) 
where Πf (pappr, mc, θ) and Πf (p, mc, θ) are the firm f’ profits for each product jϵJf in the 
counterfactual equilibrium and at the baseline, respectively. The total change in producer surplus 
is equal to the sum of profit changes for all the firms (Kim, 2004): 
                                                           ∆Π= Σf ∆Πf                                                                             (2.20) 
Focusing on consumers, the change in welfare due to a price change can be estimated using 
the Compensating Variation (CV), which represents the dollar amount a consumer would need to 
be compensated in the equilibrium without PLs to be as well off as before (Kim, 2004):  
                           CVi=
 [ln Σj expVij(p) - ln Σj expVij(pappr)]
αi
                                             (2.21) 
where Vij =αipj+ βiXj+ ξj+ γln(N), Vij(p) and Vij(pappr) are the utility levels that consumer i can get 
from product j at the baseline prices, p, and at the counterfactual prices, pappr, respectively, and αi 
is the marginal utility of income for individual i.  
Following the approach by Hausmann and Leonard (2002), the total CVi can then be 
disaggregated into two components, the “variety” and “price” effects, as follows:    
         CVi=
[ln Σj expVij(p) - ln Σj expVij(p
v)]
αi
+
[ln Σj expVij(p
v) - ln Σj expVij(pappr)]
αi
       (2.22) 
where pv, are the “virtual prices,” meaning the prices that would push demand for the new product 
(PLs) to zero. The first part of CVi in (2.22) represents the change in consumer welfare due to the 
decrease in the product assortment after PL withdrawal but keeping the prices of the remaining 
products constant (“variety effect”). The second part of CVi corresponds to the additional variation 
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in consumer surplus caused by the price reaction of the existing market brands (“price effect”) 
(Kim 2004; Xiao 2008). The total change in consumer surplus can be computed by integrating CVi 
over the population (Xiao, 2008): 
                                                      CV=M∫ CVi dPv(v)                                                      (2.23) 
 
2.4 Data and estimation 
2.4.1 Data and variables definition 
In our empirical application, we focus on the Italian yogurt market since it is characterized 
by both horizontal and vertical differentiation (i.e. functional products that carry health claims), 
and PLs have significant market shares in both segments  The yogurt industry in Italy is categorized 
as an oligopoly, as the first four manufacturers control more than 60% of the market, which has 
recently experienced a significant expansion thanks to the development of functional products that 
deliver added health value5 (Giacomo 2008; Bonanno, Huang, and Liu 2015). In our analysis, we 
distinguish among two types of functional yogurt: products that strengthen and help the 
functioning of the immune system and intestinal tract (health claim 1), and functional alternatives 
that reduce the blood cholesterol level and, thus, the risk of cardiovascular diseases (health claim 
2). 
We use Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan retailer scanner data of yogurt sales for 
a 24-month period (January 2006-December 2007) for 17 Italian regions.6 Products are defined 
based on: vendor name (vendor 1 to vendor 9 and PLs), fat content (whole vs. low-fat), flavor 
(plain, fruit, other flavors), segment (regular vs. functional) and health claim type (health claim 1 
                                                          
5 For more information about the types of functional yogurt alternatives available in the Italian market, see Bonanno, 
Huang, and Liu (2015), p.502-503. 
6 The data were provided by the Department of Agricultural and Resources Economics at the University of 
Connecticut, and by SMEA, Alta Scuola di Economia Agroalimentare, at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
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and health claim 2). Other variables included among the observable product characteristics, Xj, 
are: a drinkable indicator and a dummy variable for functional PL products. We also capture the 
potential congestion of the characteristics space by adding the natural logarithm of the number of 
products (i.e. barcodes) in each segment to follow the approach suggested by Ackerberg and 
Rysman (2005). Finally, we control for systematic differences across regions and time periods, 
including regional and seasonal fixed effects. 
 After dropping all the products with a market share lower than 0.5%, our sample consists 
of 43 products: 31 conventional and 12 functional alternatives. The market share of each brand is 
defined with respect to the total market size, M, where a market is defined as a time-region 
combination. The definition of the potential yogurt market is necessary to determine the market 
share for the outside good alternative. Following Giacomo (2008), we compute the total market 
size M by multiplying the daily per capita consumption of yogurt (125 gr) by the regional 
population, obtained from the Annuario Statistico Italiano of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 
(ISTAT), and the number of days in each time period. In this way, the average market share for 
the outside good is approximately equal to 91%. Prices are obtained as the as the ratio of the total 
value over the total volume of sales.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the average market share and price per serving for each vendor in 
the choice set. In general, regular yogurt products show higher market shares but lower prices than 
functional alternatives. This also implies that products carrying health claims ensure higher price 
premiums than the conventional ones. Vendor 1 is the market leader in the functional segment, 
while vendors 2 and 3 are the most successful players in the regular one. PLs are present in both 
segments, with higher market shares in the conventional yogurt market, where they were 
introduced much earlier. In both segments, retailers choose a low-price positioning for their own-
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brand products, and PL prices are very close to second-tier brands’ prices (i.e. vendors 4, 5 and 8) 
rather than to market leaders’ prices (vendors 1 and 2). This is probably because PLs are usually 
closer to second-tier brands in the characteristics space rather than to the market leaders (Pauwels 
and Srinivasan, 2004). 
 
2.4.2 Estimation and identification strategy 
The demand function defined in section 2.3.1 can be estimated using a Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator, as described in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo 
(2000). An estimation issue in this model is the potential endogeneity of prices, as prices are likely 
to be correlated with the unobserved product characteristics ξj, leading to biased estimates. This is 
because prices are a function of the mark-ups, which, in turn, depend on all the product 
characteristics, including the unobservable attributes (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes1995; Nevo, 
2000). To overcome this issue, we use an instrumental variables (IVs) approach.  
Following Nevo (2000; 2001), we include Hausman-type instruments i.e. the brand’s own 
prices in other regions, together with cost shifters (i.e. raw milk price, PPI cost) and the price of 
butter as IVs. The identifying assumption for using Hausmann IVs is that region-specific demand 
shocks are independent across regions, but prices of a brand in different Italian regions are 
correlated with each other because of common marginal costs. Similarly, demand shocks for butter 
and milk are independent of each other, but the prices of these two commodities are correlated 
because of common cost shocks. We also add optimal instruments to enable the estimation of 
random coefficients and to increase estimation efficiency (Vincent 2015). The estimation is 
performed using STATA 14 with the blp algorithm developed by Vincent (2015), while 
simulations are carried out in Matlab. 
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2.5 Estimation results 
2.5.1 Estimated demand parameters, elasticities and marginal costs 
Table 2.2 presents the estimated parameters for the mean utility and deviations from the 
mean of the random coefficient demand model described in section 2.3.1. The own-price yogurt 
coefficient is negative (-3.681) and significant at the 1% confidence level, and the deviation from 
the mean (0.312) is statistically significant, indicating that the taste parameter for price differs 
significantly across consumers.  
Consistent with previous studies, (Giacomo 2008; Bonanno 2012; Bonanno, Huang, and 
Liu 2015), we find that Italian yogurt consumers prefer flavoured, fruit flavoured (0.495) and 
drinkable (1.609) rather than plain (-0.580) products, and they usually attribute higher value to 
products branded by the market leaders (vendor 1: 2.728; vendor 2: 2.415). However, different 
from previous studies, our results show a preference for whole fat alternatives (0.742). The 
coefficients for both health claims7 (0.48; 0.09) are positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that Italian yogurt consumers positively value functional products. The same result was found by 
Bonanno, Huang and Liu (2015), and this justifies the price premium manufacturers can get from 
functional alternatives. Consumers positively evaluate conventional PL products (1.968), while 
the coefficient for functional PL products (PL*functional) is highly negative (-1.451) and 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This might mean that Italian consumers trust 
leading NBs more than PLs in presence of a “credence” attribute like functionality. The coefficient 
for the logarithm of the number of products in the segment (ln(N)) is statistically significant and 
slightly negative (-0.061), suggesting some “congestion effect,” as indicated by Ackerberg and 
                                                          
7 Health claim 1 refers to “general function” claims, such as helping the functioning of the intestinal tract or supporting the 
immune system, while health claim 2 includes products that reduce the absorption of cholesterol and, thus, the risk of cardio-
vascular diseases (for more details see Bonanno 2012).  
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Rysman (2005). This means that consumer utility does not increase proportionally with the number 
of products present in the market. 
The last part of Table 2.2 summarizes the performance of our instrumental variables (IVs). 
According to the results, the instruments are both valid (Hansen’s J statistic p-val=0.249) and 
relevant based on the results of the first stage F-statistic (928.1) and of the Shea’s partial R2 (0.307). 
Table 2.3 reports the statistics (means, min and max) of the own-price elasticity, market 
prices, price-cost margin and marginal cost per serving by vendor. The average own-price 
elasticity for yogurt in Italy is equal to -1.77, and it ranges between -1.09 and -3.65. These results 
are consistent with those found by Giacomo (2008), but slightly smaller than the ones found by 
Bonanno (2012) and Bonanno, Huang and Liu (2015). As expected, functional products show a 
higher price elasticity than the conventional ones. The average price-cost margin and marginal cost 
are equal to 0.21 and 0.28 euros per serving, respectively. Even though the production cost of 
yogurt is almost the same across segments and vendors, the mark-up for functional yogurt (0.39) 
is more than twice that of the conventional alternatives (0.14), explaining the growth of the 
functional yogurt segment during the last decades. Finally, in both segments, PL products present 
much lower price elasticity (-1.17 for regular and -1.85 for functional yogurt) than the NB 
counterparts (respectively, -1.58 and -2.49). This last finding is probably due to PLs’ usually being 
priced lower than NBs. 
 
2.5.2 Counterfactual simulations results 
To evaluate the welfare implications of PL entry, we carry out three simulations. 
Simulations 1 and 2 consider the scenarios where PLs were not introduced in the horizontally 
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differentiated (regular yogurt) or in the vertically differentiated (functional yogurt) segment, 
respectively, while in simulation 3 we assume that PLs did not enter either of them. 
Table 2.4 presents the percentage changes in prices, margins, market shares and profits for 
NBs and PLs under the three simulated scenarios. The results from all simulations show that if 
PLs were not in the market, NB prices would be higher (+1.14%, +0.08% and +1.23%, 
respectively). This is consistent with the theoretical literature on new products and PL entry (Mills 
1995; Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Réquillart 1999) that claims that the introduction of store 
brands leads to lower NB prices as it reduces the double-marginalization issue within the supply 
chain and enhances competition (“price-effect”). The same outcome is found by Cohen and 
Cotterill (2011) for the U.S. milk market. On the other hand, the price of the PLs left in the market 
would be slightly lower (-0.01%). 
The price reaction of NBs is more sizeable when PLs disappear from the regular yogurt 
segment rather than from the functional one. This last result can be explained by considering that 
PLs have a much higher market share and, consequently, market power in the former (1.0%) than 
in the latter (0.08%). Furthermore, the withdrawal of PLs from all yogurt segments (simulation 3) 
has the highest effect on increasing NB prices (+1.23%). This is because, in this last scenario, the 
market power that retailers exert through their brands is completely eliminated from the yogurt 
market, lowering the competition pressure and allowing NBs to raise their prices and profits. Our 
results also show that when PLs disappear from the regular yogurt segment (simulation 1), the 
price increase is higher for regular NBs than for the functional ones. The opposite is true in 
simulation 2, where functional PLs are not in the market.  
Contrary to Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004), we do not find evidence of an opposite price 
reaction among premium and second-tier NBs. However, our disaggregated results show that price 
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reactions are slightly higher for second-tier brands than for the market leaders. For example, in 
simulation 1, vendor 4 (second-tier brand) raises the prices of its regular brands on average by 
50% more than vendors 2 and 3 (segment leaders). This may suggest that second-tier brands are 
more affected by PL entry than the premium NBs, probably because of PL positioning, and as a 
result must assume a more retaliatory pricing strategy (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002; Pauwels 
and Srinivasan 2004; Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004; Richards, Hamilton, and Patterson 
2010).  
Given the assumption of constant marginal costs, the price increase (decrease) detected 
after PL withdrawal translates into higher (lower) price-cost margins for NBs (PLs). Moreover, 
since the price increase is not followed by a proportional decrease in sales, we find that NB profits 
increase in all simulated scenarios. As for the price reaction, the rise in profits is higher when PLs 
disappear from the regular yogurt segment rather than from the functional one and is the largest in 
simulation 3. Despite the decrease in prices, PL profits increase to a lower extent than do the NB 
prices. This last finding can be explained by the fact PL market shares do not increase accordingly. 
A potential explanation for this result may be the existence of  the “umbrella effect” or “cross-
category synergies” for PLs, as supported by Sayman, Hoch, and Raju (2002) and Richards, 
Yonezawa, and Winter (2015). 
Table 2.5 summarizes the impacts of PL withdrawal on welfare under the three simulated 
scenarios. If PLs were not in the Italian yogurt market, producer surplus would be lower (-14%). 
This means that in the absence of store brands, PL profits would only be partially re-distributed 
across the remaining NBs, leading to a contraction of the yogurt market. A potential explanation 
for this result is that some price-conscious consumers may abstain from buying in the category if 
PLs were not available (Mills 1995). The negative impact on producer surplus is particularly high 
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(-13.4%) in simulation 1, where PLs disappear from the horizontally differentiated segment, while 
it is much milder (-0.7%) in simulation 2, given the low market share that store brands hold in the 
functional yogurt segment. 
Our results also show that Italian households would be worse off (-7.4%) in the absence of 
PLs. As for producer surplus, the negative impact of PL withdrawal on consumer surplus (CS) is 
larger in simulation 1 (-7.0%) than in simulation 2 (-0.4%). Looking at the components of the 
change in consumer surplus, we find that both the “variety effect” (VE) and the “price effect” (PE) 
are both negative, as fewer products are available in the market and prices are higher. Moreover, 
the decrease in consumer welfare is mainly driven by the “variety effect.”  
Finally, focusing on the relative weights of the variety and price effects over the total effect 
(TE), we notice a significant difference between simulation 1 and 2. In particular, the variety 
(price) effect is much higher (lower) when PLs are withdrawn from the regular yogurt segment 
than from the functional one. This is what we expected, as more PL products leave the market in 
simulation 1 than in simulation 2. However, we can also interpret this outcome as follows: The 
price effect is the highest in simulation 2 because the introduction of low-price PLs in a vertically 
differentiated segment characterized by few competitors and relatively higher prices has a greater 
impact on competition than when PLs are introduced in a horizontally differentiated segment 
where the competition is already intense and average prices are low. 
 
2.6 Conclusions, limitations, and discussion 
PL products have experienced a significant expansion and differentiation during the last 
decades in Europe. Given the controversial results about the effects of PL entry, the objective of 
this chapter is to evaluate the social welfare implications of PL introduction in a differentiated 
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market, specifically, the Italian yogurt market. To do so, we carry out three sets of simulations in 
which we assume that PLs were not launched in the regular yogurt (horizontally differentiated) 
and functional yogurt (vertically differentiated) segments and in the entire yogurt market, 
respectively. 
Focusing on the competitive reaction of NBs, consistent with the findings of Cohen and 
Cotterill (2011) for the Boston milk market, our analysis shows that NB prices would be higher in 
the absence of PLs in all simulated scenarios. This is particularly true for second-tier NBs, as their 
price reaction would be stronger than the one for premium NBs. This result can be explained by 
the fact second tier brands are usually closer to PLs in the characteristics space than the market 
leaders and, therefore, are more affected by PL competition (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002; 
Pauwels and Srinivasan 2004; Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004; Richards, Hamilton, and 
Patterson 2010). Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature about the impacts of PL 
introduction on the double-marginalization issue within the supply chain and prices (i.e. Mills, 
1995; Bontems, Monier-Dilham and Réquillart 1999). Contrary to Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004), 
we do not find evidence of an opposite price reaction among premium and second-tier NBs.  
All NBs would be better off if PLs were not in the market, as their profits would be higher. 
This is particularly true when PLs are withdrawn from the regular (horizontally differentiated) 
yogurt segment, as PLs have a significant market share in this category. The impact on NB 
profitability is much milder when functional PLs are eliminated, as store brands are much less 
successful in this category. According to the estimated demand parameters from the random 
coefficient model, this may be because consumers seem to distrust store-brand products when 
credence attributes, like functionality, are present. Despite a slight price reduction, profits for the 
PLs that are left in the market increase to a lesser extent than those of competitors, as their market 
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share does not rise accordingly. This result may confirm the existence of “cross-category 
synergies” for PLs, as suggested by Sayman, Hoch, and Raju (2002) and Richards, Yonezawa and 
Winter (2015). 
In all simulated scenarios, we find that producer surplus would be lower in the absence of 
store brands, as PL profits would only be partially redistributed across the remaining NBs, leading 
to a contraction of the yogurt market. A potential explanation for this result is that some price-
conscious consumers might abstain from buying in the category if PLs were not available (Mills 
1995).  
Our results are consistent with Cohen and Cotterill’s (2011) findings and show that 
consumers would be worse off if PLs were not introduced in the yogurt market. This impact is 
mainly driven by the “variety effect,” as fewer products would be available in the market. 
However, the “price effect” would also be negative, as consumers would face higher prices on all 
NBs. Overall, PLs are more welfare-enhancing for Italian households in the regular yogurt segment 
than in the functional one. However, they appear to be more pro-competitive in the functional 
yogurt category, as the price effect is much higher in percentage terms in this case. This is because 
few options are available in this category and significant price premiums are present, so the 
presence of a low-priced PL can significantly affect the price competition. 
Overall, our results show that if PLs were not in the market, social welfare would be lower. 
This means that PLs are social welfare-enhancing rather than anti-competitive. As a consequence, 
PL expansion should not be a concern for the Italian Anti-Trust Authority. 
However, this study has some limitations. First, manufacturers’ wholesale prices are not 
observed. Even though we deal with this issue, assuming a constant mark-up rule for retailers, this 
assumption might be too restrictive. Moreover, we do not have information about potential fixed 
 
 
69 
 
and lump-sum payments made by manufacturers to retailers and how they may have changed after 
PL introduction. Finally, information on specific PLs is not available for individual retail outlets 
but only at an aggregate level.  
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Table 2.1 Average market share and price per serving (€/125gr) by vendor. 
  All  Regular Functional  
  Share Price Share Price Share Price 
Vendor 1 2.35% 0.62 0.66% 0.56 1.69% 0.69 
Vendor 2 1.12% 0.43 1.12% 0.43 - - 
Vendor 3 0.85% 0.56 0.80% 0.49 0.05% 0.63 
Vendor 4 0.65% 0.31 0.65% 0.31 - - 
Vendor 5 0.37% 0.33 0.37% 0.33 - - 
Vendor 6 0.36% 0.40 0.36% 0.40 - - 
Vendor 7 0.33% 0.59 0.13% 0.56 0.20% 0.63 
Vendor 8 0.17% 0.41 0.09% 0.35 0.09% 0.47 
Vendor 9 0.12% 1.02 - - 0.12% 1.02 
PLs 1.08% 0.41 1.00% 0.32 0.08% 0.51 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IRI Infoscan data. 
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Table 2.2 Random coefficient demand model estimation results 
Variable Parameter estimates Standard errors 
Price -3.68*** 0.24 
Price standard deviation 0.31* 0.18 
Whole 0.74*** 0.02 
Plain -0.58*** 0.04 
Fruit 0.49*** 0.02 
Drinkable 1.61*** 0.04 
Health claim 1 0.48*** 0.11 
Health claim 2 0.09**  0.03 
Number of barcodes -0.06**  0.02 
Vendor 1 2.73*** 0.06 
Vendor 2 2.42*** 0.04 
Vendor 3 1.59*** 0.05 
Vendor 4 1.03*** 0.04 
Vendor 5 1.54*** 0.05 
Vendor 6 1.70*** 0.06 
Vendor 7 0.93*** 0.04 
Vendor 8 2.46*** 0.09 
PLs 1.97*** 0.04 
PL*functional -1.45*** 0.056 
Constant -7.23*** 0.11 
Hansen J (p-val) χ2(3)=4.14 (0.25)  
Instrument power   
  F(4,18960) 928.1  
  Shea's partial R2 0.31  
  (First stage R2) 0.94   
Notes: *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
Hansen J: test value and p-value in parenthesis under the null of overidentifying instruments being 
uncorrelated to the errors.  
First Stage IV F(.): F-statistic for the test of joint significance of the IVs coefficients in the first-stage 
regressions. 
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Table 2.3 Statistics (mean, min and max) of the own-price elasticity, market prices, price-
cost margin (PCM) and marginal cost (MC) per serving. For the all market, by segment and 
by vendors. 
Vendor Elasticity Price1 PCM1 MC1 
All -1.77 0.49 0.21 0.28 
Minimum -3.65 0.30 0.02 0.27 
Maximum -1.09 1.02 0.74 0.28 
Conventional -1.51 0.41 0.14 0.28 
Functional -2.44 0.67 0.39 0.28 
National Brands     
Regular -1.58 0.43 0.16 0.28 
Functional -2.49 0.69 0.41 0.28 
Private Labels     
Regular -1.17 0.32 0.04 0.28 
Functional -1.85 0.51 0.23 0.28 
1Euro per serving.  
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Table 2.4 Percentage change in prices, margins, market shares and profits for National 
Brands and Private Labels. 
  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 
Products affected Regular PLs  Functional PLs All PLs 
% Change in price    
NBs    
All 1.14% 0.08% 1.23% 
Regular  1.45% 0.04% 1.49% 
Functional  0.43% 0.18% 0.61% 
PLs    
Regular  - -0.01% - 
Functional  -0.01% - - 
% Change in price-cost 
margin    
NBs    
All 1.80% 0.16% 1.97% 
Regular  2.14% 0.06% 2.20% 
Functional  1.00% 0.43% 1.44% 
PLs    
Regular  - -0.01% - 
Functional  -0.02% - - 
% Change in market 
share    
NBs    
All 1.89% 0.17% 2.09% 
Regular  2.24% 0.06% 2.30% 
Functional  1.08% 0.44% 1.53% 
PLs    
Regular  - 0.06% - 
Functional  1.08% - - 
% Change in profits    
NBs    
All 3.73% 0.34% 4.09% 
Regular  4.43% 0.12% 4.55% 
Functional  2.09% 0.88% 2.99% 
PLs    
Regular  - 0.06% - 
Functional  1.05% - - 
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Table 2.5 Simulated welfare impacts of PL withdrawal. 
  Baseline Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 
Producer surplus 21,421,376 18,560,673 21,278,400 18,415,397 
% change  - -13.4% -0.7% -14.0% 
Consumer surplus 939,501,231 874,222,559 935,980,058 869,948,098 
Total effect (TE) (%) - -7.0% -0.4% -7.4% 
Variety effect (VE) (%) - -6.30% -0.30% -6.70% 
Price effect (PE) (%) - -0.70% -0.10% -0.70% 
PE/TE - 10.0% 26.7% 9.5% 
Social welfare 960,922,607 892,783,232 957,258,458 888,363,494 
% change  
- 
-7.1% -0.4% -7.6% 
1Producer surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare are expressed in euros. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Effects of Anti-Price Gouging Laws during Natural Disasters 
 
3.1 Introduction and motivation 
During a natural disaster, market prices increase both because of demand and supply 
shocks. This is because, the demand for goods rises and shifts the demand curve to the right as 
consumers desire to stock up essential commodities. On the other hand, the supply curve decreases 
and shifts to the left since it becomes more expensive for sellers to obtain goods and maintain their 
operations due to the damages and supply disruptions caused by the natural disaster. These 
movements of the demand and supply curves in a free market without price restrictions naturally 
lead to higher equilibrium prices than in the pre-disaster status (Culpepper and Block 2008; Bae 
2009). 
In this scenario, legislators introduce anti-price gouging laws (henceforth APG laws) to 
prevent firms from significantly raising prices at levels higher than considered fair during a state 
of emergency (C. W. Davis 2008; Tarrant 2015). These regulations are mainly justified by the fear 
that, without them, retailers will take advantage of the disaster’s victims by disproportionately 
raise their prices to earn windfall profits, while consumers will struggle to buy basic necessities. 
Moreover, APG laws should ensure social equity, as both high and low-income consumers have 
access to essential commodities thanks to the artificial low prices (Bae 2009; Carden 2012). 
The majority of the U.S. states passed APG statues during the last decades, often in 
response to natural disasters (i.e. hurricanes) or terrorist attacks (i.e. 9/11). APG laws vary by state 
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in terms of imposed price-ceilings, goods covered, fines and criminal penalties8. In general, there 
are two main types of price controls in the U.S. in a state of emergency. The first one is the 
“percentage increase cap limit”, which prohibits post-disaster prices to increase by more than few 
percentages (usually 10% to 25%) above the pre-disaster equilibrium. On the other hand, the 
“unconscionable price limit” regulation establishes that commodities cannot be sold during a 
declared emergency at unreasonable prices as determined by the court or that grossly exceed the 
average prices before the disaster (usually during the 7-30 days preceding the emergency 
declaration) (Bae 2009). 
Despite the strong public support, APG laws are often criticized for being inefficient. 
Through a price increase, the competitive market would allocate the limited available supplies to 
the individuals who need and value them the most, therefore reaching an efficient outcome. On 
the other hand, price ceilings lead to allocative inefficiency and dead-weight losses(Culpepper and 
Block 2008; Bae 2009; Davis and Kilian 2011). As sellers face higher operation and provision 
costs during and after a natural disaster, but prices do not adjust accordingly, APG laws are also 
blamed for exacerbating supply shortages, and so, for resources not being available to those who 
need them (Culpepper and Block, 2008; Bae, 2009; Millsap, 2017). Moreover, consumers may 
face additional non-monetary costs in this situation, such as waiting in line or a decrease in 
products quality (Davis 2008; Tarrant 2015). Given these results, the overall impact of APG laws 
on consumers’ welfare is controversial, in particular in the situation where the supply is not rigid 
and can adjust to the new market condition at higher costs (i.e. import goods from further areas 
(Davis 2008).  
                                                          
8 A detailed description of APG laws by state is available at: 
 http://consumer.findlaw.com/consumer-transactions/price-gouging-laws-by-state.html    
 
 
80 
 
Another concern is the actual effectiveness of these laws. In the wake of recent hurricanes 
(i.e. Katrina (2005), Sandy (2012), Harley and Irma (2017)), thousands of complaints were lodged 
about alleged price-gouging on different commodities (i.e. fuel, hotel rooms, flights, water, food) 
in several states (Kent 2012; McMahon 2017; Millsap 2017; Phillips and Shaban 2017; Sorkin 
2017). According to some authors, the problem with current APG laws is that they are too vague 
and only few states devote many resources to enforce them (Ramasastry 2005; Von Hoffman 2012; 
Tarrant 2015). On the other hand, harsh penalty enforcement for setting too high prices may 
dramatically increase commodities shortages, as they lead suppliers to adopt very conservative 
behavior to ensure their compliance with the law (Montgomery, Baron, and Weisskopf 2007). 
Given the unsettled debate on this topic, in this chapter we develop a framework to analyze 
the effects of anti-price gouging laws on prices and product availability during a natural disaster 
and provide an empirical illustration. To recreate a quasi-experimental setting, a county in a state 
without an APG law can be used as a control group for the treatment unit (i.e. a county in a state 
with an APG law).  To be comparable, the two counties should be equally affected by the natural 
disaster and present similar socio-demographic characteristics and food retail structure. Moreover, 
they should satisfy the parallel trends assumption for the outcome variables of interest in the pre-
treatment period. A difference-in-difference matching estimator (DIDM) can then be used to 
compare changes in prices between the treatment and control groups before and after the 
emergency declaration. The DIDM estimator is superior to the traditional difference in difference 
estimator as treated and untreated units are compared based on their similarity (i.e. upc identity) 
(J. J. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; J. Heckman et al. 1998); Colantuoni and Rojas 2015). 
Similarly, variation in product availability can be tested through the simple Difference in 
Difference (DID) estimator, using the average number of barcodes sold at each retail store as a 
 
 
81 
 
proxy. Finally, a DID regression approach should be preferred to the simple DID estimator as it 
can easily accommodate more states and time periods and allows to control for additional 
covariates that may affect the outcome of interest (Gruber 1994; Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
In our empirical illustration, we use this methodology to evaluate the effects of New 
Jersey’s APG law on prices and availability of bottled-water products after hurricane Sandy 
(2012). New Jersey’s APG law prohibits an “excessive price increase” (+10%) in the sale of 
essential goods and services within 30 days after the emergency declaration. We investigate this 
question using Nielsen Retailer Scanner data of drinking water sales in 2012 for the 48-week 
period from January 1 to December 1. We select Mercer county in New Jersey and Kent county in 
Delaware as our treatment and control groups respectively, while the 5 weeks after the emergency 
declaration (October 28) represent the treatment period (i.e. APG law enactment). Our results show 
that the APG law in New Jersey might be effective in keeping prices low after hurricane Sandy. 
Moreover, differently from the theoretical predictions on price control measures (Culpepper and 
Block, 2008; Bae, 2009; Millsap, 2017), we do not find evidence of the APG law exacerbating 
supply shortages in Mercer county compared to Kent county in the period that follows the natural 
disaster. 
The framework we develop can be used to compare changes in prices and product 
availability for several product categories and different couple of counties and states, to assess the 
differential impacts of APG laws across product categories (i.e. food vs non-food) as well as the 
effectiveness of different APG laws. An analysis of this type can be very useful for policymakers 
to get a better understanding of the impacts of APG laws on consumers’ welfare and to derive 
policy implications.   
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in section 3.2 we review the existing 
literature on price control and natural disasters, while in section 3.3 we explain our model and 
estimation strategy. In section 3.4, we describe our empirical illustration (3.4.1), the data we use 
in the analysis (3.4.2) and results (3.4.3). 
 
3.2 Literature review and contributions 
Several papers investigate the economic impacts of natural disasters, for example focusing 
on their effects on growth (Strobl 2011, 2012; Tarrant 2015), labor market and unemployment rate 
(Brown, Mason, and Tiller 2006; Cahoon 2006; Coughlan 2012; Strobl and Walsh 2009), sales 
(Belasen and Dai 2014; Beatty, Shimshack, and Volpe 2018) and inflation (Parker 2016; Heinen, 
Khadan, and Strobl 2018). Similarly, the welfare consequences of price ceiling regulations have 
been discussed theoretically by many authors. For example, Barzel (1974; 1989) and Deacon and 
Sonstelie (1985) and claim that price controls may cause dead-weight losses for the society not 
only because of shortages, but also because of higher non-monetary costs for consumers, for 
example in terms of higher waiting costs and quality adjustment. Moreover, regulated prices may 
cause a misallocation of resource (=allocative inefficiency) that reduces consumer welfare, even 
in presence of a perfectly inelastic supply, and encourage rent-seeking behaviors for the firms (L. 
W. Davis and Kilian 2011; Bulow and Klemperer 2012). 
However, only few studies exist that evaluate the effects of price ceilings, like APG laws, 
in presence of natural disasters, and the empirical applications are scant. Samuels and Puro (1991) 
analyze the market response to Hurricane Hugo (1989) and the San Francisco earthquake and they 
find that the majority of firms does not increase their prices after these natural disasters, even in 
the absence of price control. The authors claim that this result may derive from the sellers’ fear of 
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long-run “reputation costs”. Similarly, Cavallo et al. (2014) study the behavior of supermarket 
prices and product availability after two earthquakes in Chile and Japan. They notice that prices 
did not increase for months after the disasters, even though many products were experiencing 
stockouts and no APG laws exist in these countries. They suggest that these results are consistent 
with the pricing models where retailers fear “consumer’s anger”. Montgomery, Baron, and 
Weisskopf (2007) assess the potential economic costs of introducing a federal APG law in the U.S. 
as proposed after Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Their results show that such regulation would have 
increased the economic damages due to gasoline supply disruptions by $1.5-2.9 billion during the 
two-month period after the hurricanes. Finally, Neilson (2009) using a hand-collected dataset of 
retail gas prices finds no evidences of price gouging behavior during Hurricane Rita. His results 
show that even though wholesale prices increased during the natural disaster, retail prices 
increased less than proportionally, leading to a reduction in retail mark-ups which is consistent 
with station owners being altruistic.  
This chapter contributes to the existing body of literature on APG laws and natural disasters 
in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically evaluate 
the effects of APG laws on prices, product availability of necessary food products during a natural 
disaster in the U.S. Moreover, our econometric approach (difference-in-difference estimator) 
represents an improvement with respect to previous studies as it allows to establish a causal 
relationship between APG laws and the outcomes of interest, and so, to test the theoretical 
predictions on this subject.  
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3.3 Model and methods 
The impacts of APG laws on prices and product availability during a natural disaster can be 
estimated using the regression difference-in-difference (DID) approach. The DID method is 
widely used to evaluate the causal effects of policy interventions as it removes bias from time-
invariant confounders (Colantuoni and Rojas 2015; Kortelainen, Raychaudhuri, and Roussillon 
2016). Moreover, differently from the simple DID estimator, the regression DID approach can 
easily accommodate more states and time periods and allows to control for additional covariates 
that may affect the outcome of interest (Gruber 1994; Angrist and Pischke n.d.). However, a 
common criticism of the DID method is the uncertainty about the ability of the control group to 
faithfully reproduce the counterfactual outcome of interest in the absence of the treatment 
(Kortelainen, Raychaudhuri, and Roussillon 2016). To overcome this issue, a county in a 
neighboring state without an APG law can serve as a control group for the treatment unit (i.e. a 
county in a state with an APG law). Moreover, to be comparable, the two counties should be 
equally affected by the natural disaster and present similar socio-demographic characteristics and 
food retail structure.  
Following Colantuoni and Rojas (2015), the difference-in-difference matching estimator 
(DIDM) approach can be used to measure changes in price of a given product (i.e. barcode) 
between the treatment and control groups before and after the emergency declaration, and so, the 
enactment of the APG law. The DIDM estimator is superior to the traditional DID estimator as 
treated and untreated units are compared based on their similarity (i.e. product identity), without 
relying on propensity scores (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckman et al. 1998; 
Colantuoni and Rojas 2015). The DIDM regression equation has the following form:  
                  lnPict= α + βTreat + γPost + δ(Post*Treat) + ΣjσjXij + ΣnπSn + μTime  + εict                    (3.1) 
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where i, c, and t denote product, county and time, respectively, lnPict is the natural logarithm of 
price of product i, Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the county in the state with an APG 
law and 0 otherwise, Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-hurricane period and 0 
otherwise, Xij’s are observable characteristics of product i that might affect the outcome of interest 
(i.e. brand fixed effects, size, packaging), Sn are seasonal dummy variables, time is a continuous 
time variable, εict is the error term, where E(εict/c,t)=0, while α , β, γ, δ, σj’s, π and μ are the 
parameters to be estimated. In particular, δ is the causal effect of interest as it represents the change 
in prices specific to the county in the state with an APG law (relative to the county in the state with 
no price control) in the period after the hurricane (relative to the period before the hurricane) 
(Gruber, 1994; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Moreover, the logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable (lnPist) allows to interpret δ as the percentage change in prices due to the APG 
law (Colantuoni and Rojas 2015; Kortelainen, Raychaudhuri, and Roussillon 2016).  
Similarly, following Card and Krueger (1994), a simple DID estimator approach can be 
employed to assess the variations in product availability between the treated and control groups, 
using the average number of barcodes sold for a given product category at the store level as a 
proxy, as follows: 
                          lnNsct= α +βTreat + γPost + δ(Post*Treat) + ΣjσjXsj + ΣnπSn + εsct                           (3.2) 
where s, c, and t denote store, county and time, respectively, lnNsct is the natural logarithm of the 
number of barcodes sold at store s, Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the county in the state 
with an APG law and 0 otherwise, Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-hurricane period 
and 0 otherwise, Xij’s include store and retail chain fixed effects, Sn are seasonal dummy variables, 
εsct is the error term, where E(εsct/c,t)=0, while α , β, γ, δ, σj’s, and π are the parameters to be 
estimated. As for the price DIDM regression equation, δ is the causal effect of interest as it 
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represents the percentage change in product availability between the treated and control groups 
after the emergency declaration due to the APG law. 
The key identifying assumption for causal inference in the DID framework is the “common 
(or parallel) trends” assumption. This means that, in the absence of treatment, the trends of the 
outcome of interest in the treatment and control groups would have been the same (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). To verify that this condition holds in this case, one should compare the pre-
hurricane trajectories of prices and products availability in the two counties. This can be done 
through visual inspection or using the following regression approach: 
                        lnPict= α + βTreat + γTime + δ(Treat*Time) + ΣjσjXij + ΣnπSn + εict                       (3.3) 
            lnNsct= α +βTreat + γ Time + δ(Treat*Time ) + ΣjσjXsj + ΣnπSn + εsct                         (3.4)  
where Time is a continuous time variable. δ is the parameter of interest as it represents the 
difference in the time-trend of the outcome of interest between the two counties. 
 
3.4 Empirical illustration 
3.4.1 Illustration overview 
To illustrate our framework, we analyze the effects of New Jersey’s APG law on prices 
and availability of bottled water products during Hurricane Sandy (2012). This is because, 
hurricanes are the most common natural disasters in the North Atlantic states and hurricane Sandy 
was one of the costliest disasters for which rich data are currently available (Tarrant, 2015). New 
Jersey was severely impacted by this natural disaster and was hit the hardest by power outages 
(CNN Wire Staff, 2012). Moreover, drinking water is an essential commodity for survival, it is 
storable and public water sources are often considered unsafe during natural disasters (Beatty, 
Shimshack, and Volpe 2018). 
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New Jersey’s APG law prohibits an “excessive price increase” in the sale of essential goods 
and services within 30 days after the emergency declaration or for such a period as the Governor 
may specify in the declaration of the emergency state. A price surge is deemed to be “excessive” 
if it exceeds by more than 10 percent the price at which the good or service was sold before the 
state of emergency (New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, 2017). Before Hurricane Sandy 
landfall, Governor Chris Christie declared a statewide state of emergency in New Jersey on 
October 28, 2012 (FEMA). Nevertheless, the New Jersey Consumer Affairs Division received 
thousands of complaints for alleged price gouging in the wake of Sandy (Powell, 2012).  
Following Colantuoni and Rojas (2015), we choose a neighboring state without and APG 
law, Delaware, as control group. This is mainly because, given their geographical proximity, New 
Jersey and Delaware were similarly affected by hurricane Sandy (FEMA-MOFT). Differently 
from them, as we cannot distinguish city-level observations in our dataset, we focus on the two 
counties where the capital cities (Trenton and Dover) are located: Mercer county in New Jersey 
(Trenton) and Kent county in Delaware (Dover). 
 
3.4.2 Data and estimation 
In our analysis, we use Retail Scanner data collected by the Nielsen Corporation and 
provided by the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at University of Connecticut. 
This dataset consists of weekly pricing, volume and store merchandising conditions for all the 
participating retail stores in the U.S. Transactions are recorded at checkout scanners and are 
obtained from supermarkets, including food stores, mass merchandisers, drug and convenience 
stores. For each store, it is possible to identify the state and county where it is located, as well as 
the store’s retail chain. Moreover, for each product having a Universal Product Code (UPC), 
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detailed product attributes are provided, such as type, brand, size, flavor, formula and container 
description, as well as, weekly volume weighted price, number of units sold and presence of 
promotional activities (i.e. feature and display). 
Our sample consists of weekly bottled water sales data in Mercer and Kent counties in 
2012 for the 48-week period from January 1 to December 1. Sales data were collected at 66 retail 
stores. Half of them are located in Mercer county while the other half are in Kent county and all 
of them were opened both before and after hurricane Sandy. Mercer county (NJ) represents our 
treatment group (Treat), while Kent county (DE) is used as control group. Weekly observations up 
to the week ending on October 27 represent the pre-hurricane period, while the post-hurricane 
variable (Post) represents the 5-week period after the emergency declaration in New Jersey 
(October 28).  
Our dependent variable in the DID estimation of product availability is the number of 
barcodes sold at the retail store level. As three stores opened in New Jersey between April and 
August 2012, we have an unbalanced panel of 3,090 observations. On the other hand, having a 
balanced panel is a necessary condition for the matching procedure we use to assess changes in 
prices. As a consequence, following Colantuoni and Rojas (2015), we select only those bottled-
water products that are present in all weeks and in both counties to carry out the DIDM estimation 
for prices. However, differently from them, we focus our analysis at the product level rather than 
at the brand level. This is because, each brand has multiple UPC associated to it, with different 
size and packaging characteristics, and so, prices. Before the onset of a hurricane landfall, 
consumers stockpile essential commodities, and so, they are likely to buy bigger water bottles or 
multi-pack products, which are usually characterized by lower price per ounce than smaller ones. 
Aggregating at the brand level might lead to attribute a decrease in prices to the presence of the 
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APG law rather than to this change in consumers’ choices (i.e. large water-bottles).  In table 3.1, 
we report the selected products for this analysis with their corresponding brand name, market share 
and average price by county. These 46-products account for almost 50% and 80% of total bottled 
water sales in Mercer and Kent counties respectively. We normalize prices (price-per-ounce) to 
make different-sized products comparable (Kortelainen, Raychaudhuri, and Roussillon 2016). Our 
sample consists of 4,416 observations (46 products*48 weeks*2 counties). 
In table 3.2 we compare some socio-demographic and retail structure characteristics of the 
two counties, as well as, bottled-water sales. Even though Mercer county (366,513) has more than 
double the population of Kent county (162,310), the median income per capita ($67,662 and 
$51,695 respectively) is very similar in the two areas. Similarly, the number of retail stores is much 
higher in the first (188) than in the latter (35). However, their retail structure shows common 
features both in terms of store types (i.e. convenience stores vs grocery stores) and size-class 
distribution. In details, the percentage of convenience stores is almost identical (34% vs 35%) and 
small stores (less than 50 employee size class) represent more than 80% of total establishments in 
both counties. In addition, the average per capita bottled-water sales are about 5 gallons in both 
areas. Focusing on the variables of interest for this analysis, the average price per ounce of bottled 
water ($0.0281 vs $0.0289) and the number of products sold per retail store (23.6 and 24.9) are 
very similar in the two counties. Moreover, looking at figure 3.1 and 3.2, we can see that the price 
and product availability trends in the pre-hurricane period in Kent county closely resemble those 
in Mercer county. This might imply that our treatment and control groups satisfy the “parallel 
trends assumption”, and so, any changes in trends in the post-hurricane period can be attributed to 
the APG enactment. The results for the formal tests of the “parallel trends” assumption as in (5) 
and (6) are reported in the next section (3.4.3). 
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The DID estimations for product availability and prices are carried out in STATA 14 
through ordinary least square (OLS) regression and panel-data adjusted linear regression 
respectively (reg and xtreg command respectively). 
 
3.4.3 Results 
As explained in section 3.4.1, the “parallel trends” assumption is a crucial requirement to 
ensure the reliability of the DID estimator. As this condition is difficult to hold in non-experimental 
settings, we need to check how plausible this assumption is in this scenario. The usual approach 
in the literature is to use the pre-treatment data to check whether the evolution of the outcome 
variables of interest is the same in the treatment and control groups (Colantuoni and Rojas 2015; 
Kortelainen, Raychaudhuri, and Roussillon 2016). In this case, this means testing whether the 
time-trends of prices and product availability before hurricane Sandy landfall are the same in 
Mercer and Kent county, as shown in equation (5) and (6). The results for the “parallel trends” test 
for prices and product availability are reported in table 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. As we expected 
from the analysis of figure 3.1 and 3.2, the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 
treated county (Treat) proves that the average price-per-oz (-0.021***) and number of barcodes sold 
at retail stores (-0.033**) are lower in Mercer county than in Kent county. However, the coefficients 
of the interaction term between the treated county and time variables (Treat*Time) are not 
statistically different from zero in both cases (-0.0002 and 0.00001 respectively). This means that 
the time-trends for prices and product availability in Mercer and Kent counties are not statistically 
different from each other. We can indeed argue that the “parallel trends” assumption holds in this 
case, and so, that the DID method can provides unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. In 
addition, almost all the coefficients for the size and packaging characteristics of bottled-water 
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products are statistically different from zero, with larger and multi-pack items showing lower 
prices than the ones of smaller goods. This result confirms the need to use products rather than 
brands as unit of observation in this analysis, as explained in section 3.4.2. 
Table 3.5 and 3.6 show the results for the DIDM and DID estimations for prices and 
product availability respectively. Recall that we define the treated unit (Treat) as Mercer county 
and the post-treatment period (Post) as the 5-weeks following hurricane Sandy landfall and the 
emergency declaration in New Jersey (October 28, 2012). Moreover, we use the logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variables (average price-per-oz and number of barcodes sold at 
the store level) to be able to interpret the coefficients as percentage changes.  
Focusing on prices, the negative and statistically significant coefficient (-0.026***) for the 
treated county variable (Treat) shows that the average price-per-oz in Mercer county is lower than 
the one in Kent county. We also find that prices in the after-hurricane period (Post) are higher than 
before the hurricane landfall (0.019**). The causal effect of interest for evaluating the impact of 
APG laws on prices is represented by the coefficient of the interaction term between the treated 
state and the post-hurricane period (Treat*Post). We find that this coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant, meaning that prices in the post-hurricane period are lower in Mercer 
county than in Kent county. Moreover, comparing the Post (0.019) and Treat*Post (-0.018) 
coefficients magnitude, we can conclude that prices in Mercer county are almost unchanged 
between the before and after-hurricane periods. As a consequence, one might argue that the New 
Jersey APG law is effective in keeping prices stable during a declared state of emergency, as the 
one that follows hurricane Sandy. However, all the coefficients are very small in absolute terms, 
making it difficult to derive conclusive findings and policy implications.  
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Similarly, looking at table 3.6, the coefficient for the treated county (Treat) (-0.230***) in 
the DID regression for product availability indicates that the average number of barcodes sold at 
the store level in Mercer county is lower than the one in Kent county. Moreover, our results show 
that the average number of UPCs sold in the after-treatment period (Post) is lower than the one 
before hurricane Sandy (-0.154***). This might imply that product availability decreases in both 
areas after hurricane Sandy landfall because of supply disruptions. However, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between the treated county and post period (Treat*Post) is not statistically different 
from zero. This might imply that the presence of the APG law in New Jersey does not worsen the 
supply shortage that takes place during the state of emergency that follows hurricane Sandy. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and discussion 
APG laws are introduced to prevent firms from significantly raising prices at levels higher 
than considered fair during a state of emergency, such as the one that follows a natural disaster as 
a hurricane. In this paper we develop a framework to analyze the impacts of these laws on prices 
and product availability and provide an empirical illustration. A DID regression approach can be 
used to evaluate changes in the outcome variables of interest between a county with an APG law 
(treated) and a county without price control laws (control) before and after the natural disaster. To 
be comparable, the two counties should be equally affected by the natural disaster and present 
similar socio-demographic characteristics and food retail structure. Moreover, they should satisfy 
the “parallel trends” assumption for the outcome variables (prices and product availability) in the 
pre-treatment period. As suggested by Colantuoni and Rojas (2015), when disaggregated sales data 
are available, a DIDM estimator should be preferred to the simple DID method, as the comparison 
of treated and control groups is based on their similarity (i.e. brand or product identity). 
 
 
93 
 
In our empirical illustration, we assess the effects of New Jersey’s APG law on prices and 
availability of bottled-water products after hurricane Sandy (2012). To do so, we use the DIDM 
and DID estimators respectively to compare the changes in the average price per ounce for each 
UPC and the average number of products sold per retail store between the treated group, Mercer 
county (NJ), and the control group, Kent county (DE). Our results show that, overall, prices 
increase after the hurricane landfall, but prices in Mercer county are lower than the ones in Kent 
county and are almost the same as before the emergency declaration. This might indicate that the 
APG law of New Jersey is effective in keeping bottled-water prices stable in the period that follows 
the natural disaster. On the other hand, we find that the number of products sold at the store level 
decreases in the post-hurricane period in both areas, probably because of supply disruptions. 
However, there is no statistical difference in product availability between the two counties. 
Therefore, one might argue that the presence of the APG in New Jersey does not exacerbate the 
supply shortages of bottled-water products after hurricane Sandy. This result is in contrast with 
the conventional economic wisdom on price control and supply shortages (Culpepper and Block, 
2008; Bae, 2009; Millsap, 2017). 
However, this study is not without limitations. First, this analysis should be extended to 
more product categories and couple of counties to ensure the generalizability of these results and 
derive policy implications. Moreover, we use the number of barcodes sold at retail stores as a 
proxy for product availability. However, this variable may not completely reflect the entire product 
assortment of each retail store. Finally, the DID estimator does not provide unbiased estimate of 
the causal effect of interest when treatment assignment depends on unobserved time-variant 
factors. We are not aware of any reasons that would violate this assumption in the present 
application. 
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Table 3.1 Selected products, market share and price ($) by county. 
Brand name Size (oz) Multipack Mercer county Kent county 
      Share Price ($) Share Price ($) 
Aquafina 33.8  0.2% 1.73 0.5% 1.60 
 20  1.4% 1.64 2.5% 1.60 
  16.9 24-bottle 2.4% 5.06 7.6% 5.31 
Dasani 20  1.5% 1.58 2.2% 1.54 
 33.8  0.5% 1.43 0.7% 1.38 
 12 8-bottle 0.4% 3.41 0.5% 3.56 
  16.9 24-bottle 2.6% 5.09 4.5% 5.42 
Nestlè Pure Life 8 24-bottle 0.3% 4.29 0.3% 4.29 
 16.9 24-bottle 1.8% 4.50 5.7% 4.50 
  128   0.2% 1.56 0.7% 1.49 
Crystal Geyser 128  0.6% 1.00 0.8% 1.00 
  16.9 6-bottle 0.2% 1.65 0.2% 1.62 
Poland Spring 128  0.9% 1.15 0.2% 1.24 
 320  0.5% 3.20 0.3% 3.20 
 33.8  0.2% 1.26 0.2% 1.62 
 16.9 6-bottle 0.1% 2.56 0.1% 3.00 
 8 12-bottle 0.4% 2.40 0.2% 2.40 
 11 8-bottle 0.2% 2.08 0.3% 2.16 
 101.4  0.8% 1.43 0.6% 1.55 
 23.7  0.3% 1.26 0.4% 1.35 
 16.9 24-bottle 11.2% 4.83 6.7% 5.06 
 16.9 6-bottle 0.3% 1.77 0.1% 1.78 
  16.9 12-bottle 0.2% 3.90 0.1% 3.95 
Evian 33.8  0.2% 1.89 0.2% 2.05 
  33.8 6-bottle 0.2% 9.77 0.3% 9.81 
Deer Park 101.4  0.3% 1.12 1.4% 1.25 
 8 12-bottle 0.2% 2.37 1.1% 2.49 
 128  0.2% 1.22 0.7% 1.15 
 16.9 6-bottle 0.2% 1.73 0.6% 1.81 
  16.9 24-bottle 1.5% 4.64 8.7% 4.93 
Fiji 16.9  0.2% 1.29 0.5% 1.32 
 33.8  0.3% 2.00 0.6% 2.00 
 50.7  0.2% 2.39 0.1% 2.36 
  16.9 6-bottle 0.3% 6.04 0.6% 6.26 
Glaceau Smart 
Water 33.8 6-bottle 0.1% 8.04 0.2% 7.97 
 20 6-bottle 0.2% 5.85 0.4% 6.29 
  33.8   0.7% 1.55 1.0% 1.58 
Private Label 16.9 24-bottle 1.7% 3.48 2.9% 3.83 
 16.9 24-bottle 6.5% 3.13 16.7% 3.01 
 16.9 24-bottle 2.2% 3.80 3.9% 3.57 
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 20  0.2% 0.84 0.4% 0.81 
 128  0.9% 1.10 1.4% 1.12 
 128  0.2% 0.91 0.2% 0.86 
 128  0.3% 0.95 0.7% 1.04 
 128  0.7% 1.23 1.6% 1.46 
  128   0.4% 1.06 2.0% 1.04 
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Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics, retail-structure and bottled-water sales by 
county. 
  Mercer county, NJ Kent county, DE 
Populationa 366,513 162,310 
Median income ($)a 67,662 51,695 
Number of retail-storesb 188 35 
% of convenience storesb 35.1 34.3 
% of 1-49 employee size class storesb 89.4 80.0 
% of 50-499 employee size class storesb 10.6 20.0 
% of 500 or more employee size class storesb 0.0 0.0 
Mean volume per capita (gal)c 5.26 5.78 
Mean price per oz ($)c 0.0281 0.0287 
Mean number of UPCs sold per storec 22.6 24.9 
a2012 population estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
bAuthor’s elaboration of 2012 County Business Patterns data (U.S. Census Bureau). 
cAuthor’s elaboration of 2012 Nielsen Retail Scanner data. 
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Table 3.3 Parallel trends test results for prices. 
Variable Parameter estimates Standard error 
Treat -0.021*** 0.007 
Time -0.001* 0.001 
Treat*Time -0.0002 0.0003 
Constant -2.822*** 0.272 
Size   
12 oz -0.485*** 0.181 
16.9 oz 0.250 0.263 
20 oz 0.154 0.317 
32 oz -0.288 0.261 
50.7 oz -1.332*** 0.244 
320 oz -1.549*** 0.317 
Multipack   
6-bottle -0.270* 0.143 
8-bottle -0.422 0.333 
12-bottle -0.509** 0.230 
24-bottle -0.872*** 0.177 
Spring 0.015** 0.008 
Summer  0.036*** 0.014 
Fall 0.053*** 0.019 
N 3956  
R2 0.948   
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the average price per oz. Treat is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 for the county with the APG law and 0 for the county without the APG law. 
*, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Brand fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
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Table 3.4 Parallel trends test results for product availability. 
Variable Parameter estimates Standard error 
Treat -0.033** 0.016 
Time 0.001 0.001 
Treat*Time 0.00001 0.001 
Constant 3.894*** 0.018 
Spring 0.039** 0.017 
Summer  0.068** 0.030 
Fall 0.035 0.041 
N 2760  
adj-R2 0.862   
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of barcodes sold at the store level. Treat is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the county with the APG law and 0 for the county without the APG 
law.  
*, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Store and retail chain fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
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Table 3.5 Difference-in-difference matching estimation results for prices. 
Variable Parameter estimates Standard error 
Treat -0.026*** 0.004 
Post 0.019** 0.009 
Treat*Post -0.018* 0.011 
Constant -2.811*** 0.271 
Size   
12 oz -0.494*** 0.181 
16.9 oz 0.241 0.262 
20 oz 0.149 0.315 
32 oz -0.299 0.260 
50.7 oz -1.344*** 0.243 
320 oz -1.558*** 0.315 
Multipack   
6-bottle -0.278** 0.143 
8-bottle -0.432 0.332 
12-bottle -0.517** 0.229 
24-bottle -0.873*** 0.176 
Spring 0.016** 0.008 
Summer  0.039*** 0.014 
Fall 0.057*** 0.019 
Time -0.001** 0.001 
N 4416  
R2 0.949   
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the average price per oz. Treat is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 for the county with the APG law and 0 for the county without the APG law. Post is a dummy that 
is 1 after the emergency declaration (10/28) and 0 before this date. The DIDM estimator is the coefficient 
on the interaction term Treat*Post. 
*, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Brand fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
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Table 3.6 Difference-in-difference estimation results for product availability. 
Variable Parameter estimates Standard error 
Treat -0.230*** 0.025 
Post -0.154*** 0.011 
Treat*Post 0.019 0.015 
Constant 3.969*** 0.031 
Spring 0.054*** 0.007 
Summer  0.098*** 0.007 
Fall 0.072*** 0.008 
N 3090  
adj-R2 0.947   
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of barcodes sold at the store level. Treat is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the county with the APG law and 0 for the county without the APG 
law. Post is a dummy that is 1 after the emergency declaration (10/28) and 0 before this date. The DIDM 
estimator is the coefficient on the interaction term Treat*Post. 
*, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Store and retail chain fixed effects coefficients omitted for brevity. 
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Figure 3.1 Average price per ounce by county and week. 
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Figure 3.2 Average number of barcodes sold at retail stores by county and week. 
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